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ABSTRACT 
This study treats the character of French nuclear policy since September 11, 2001; 
as such this work adds the most recent episode to a theme that, since the late-1950s, has 
concerned alliance statecraft faced with French “exceptionalism” in trans-Atlantic 
relations.  In the post-Cold War era, the changes in the strategic environment have led to 
a further evolution in French nuclear deterrent policy which forms the heart of this study.   
In 2001 and 2006, French President Chirac made policy speeches which specifically 
discussed nuclear strategy and clarified the shift in French thought and the justification 
for deterrence.  In 2001, the most important element addressed dissuasion of regional 
powers and “rogue” states with WMD that may attack France.  The 2006 speech 
incorporated the threat of state-sponsored terrorism into the nuclear dissuasion strategy.   
The thesis investigates past and present developments in French nuclear strategy, 
with chief emphasis on the period from the end of the Cold War to the beginning of the 
twenty-first century; it highlights the forces that have shaped French doctrine and 
analyzes the viability of the nuclear strategy as seen by a U.S. observer.  A review of 
French Cold War doctrine provides the necessary backdrop for an evaluation of new 
elements in French nuclear strategy and should act as a guide to students of same in U.S. 
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A. NEW THREATS AND THE EVOLUTION OF CONTEMPORARY 
STRATEGIES POST SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
 On January 19, 2006, French President Jacques Chirac explained the early 
twenty-first century evolution in French nuclear deterrent strategy thus: 
The leaders of states, who would use terrorist means against us, as well as 
those who would envision using…weapons of mass destruction, must 
understand that they would lay themselves open to a firm and fitting 
response on our part.  This response could be a conventional one.  It could 
also be of a different kind.1   
 
The statement implies that a nuclear strike is now an option of French strategy against 
state-sponsored terrorism.  This revision in nuclear strategy can be seen as a result of the 
September 11, 2001, al Qaeda attacks on the United States and the ongoing diplomatic 
efforts to limit the Iranian nuclear program.  President Chirac clarified several aspects of 
French doctrine which have been the cornerstones of French nuclear deterrent strategy 
since the end of the Cold War.  Additionally, he elaborated on many new aspects of the 
strategy, thus providing justification and reasoning behind the principles of the new 
doctrine.  The speech met with mixed response throughout the international community 
causing alarm, for instance, among the left in Germany, long suspicious of Gaullist 
nuclear ideas, and was scrutinized by some experts and praised by many makers of 
policy.  These mixed responses brought to the forefront critical questions concerning 
nuclear deterrent policy and its usefulness in the post-Cold War era. 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons has continued since the Cold War, creating 
the opportunity for regional powers, “rogue” states and terrorist organizations to attain 
nuclear capabilities.  This proliferation is most evident in the recent attempts by Iran and 
North Korea to attain and/or test nuclear capabilities and accelerate their nuclear 
programs in light of opposition throughout the international community.  Statesmen, 
policy-makers, academics and activists as well as military strategists have joined many 
                                                 
1 Jacques Chirac (speech, Strategic Air and Maritime Forces at Landivisiau / L'Ile Longue, France, 
January 19, 2006): 
http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/anglais/speeches_and_documents/2006/speech_by_jacques_chirac_president_o
f_the_french_republic_during_his_visit_to_the_stategic_forces.38447.html (accessed May 23, 2006). 
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international organizations to address concerns over strategies regarding nuclear weapons 
and the potential fallout of particular strategies.  Since the end of the Cold War and the 
stalemate between competing superpowers, the issue of nuclear strategy has once again 
become of utmost importance, not only for those that have nuclear weapons, but also for 
the “have-not’s” who aspire to attain them.  Surely non-proliferation has become more 
important, but the nuclear strategies that might negatively impact efforts by the 
international community to curb the threat of nuclear attack by extremist groups or 
“rogue” states have attained a greater prominence in strategic thought and practice as 
well.  The world of the early twenty-first century is no longer one in which the mid- 
twentieth century principle of mutually assured destruction maintains a balance of power.  
Quite the contrary, as the threat of terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction 
provided by “rogue” states or regional powers becomes more ominous, the issue of 
nuclear strategy has become increasingly important to world leaders.  Many such 
institutions as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN) 
and several Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) have shown interest in evolving 
nuclear strategies and capabilities which may have a critical impact on world events.  
Not-withstanding, as globalization continues to advance and the proliferation of nuclear 
technology becomes more readily available, nuclear policy and strategy will be of critical 
concern for the multitude of individuals and organizations, states and nations which have 
a vested interest in understanding and designing current nuclear strategies and policy. 
B.  PURPOSE 
The thesis will investigate the evolution of French nuclear strategy from the end 
of the Cold War to the beginning of the twenty-first century and assess the viability of 
this doctrine in relation to terrorist threats, such regional powers as Iran and the current 
international environment.  French doctrine has shifted from the Cold War “anti-cities” 
strategy primarily aimed at deterring the more robust and advanced Soviet Union, to a 
strategy that incorporates potential responses to major power threats, regional actors, and 
“rogue” states that may sponsor terrorist organizations and their actions.  Throughout 
this examination the focus will be on the historical changes in French doctrine, 
technology and nuclear strategy and those events and philosophies that helped shape 
French strategic thought.  For the purpose of this thesis these events and philosophies 
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will be categorized as political, ideological, military, economic, and international, each 
of which play a significant role in shaping French doctrine.   The political and 
ideological issues can be linked to France’s post-1945 search for “grandeur” in the 
international system, while the military and economic issues can be seen as limiting 
forces on the shape of French doctrine.  International events play a significant role in 
this subject due to the force of new threats and crises that have a pronounced effect on 
policy.  More specifically, this thesis will address the issue of France as a regional 
nuclear power and speculate on the overall validity of nuclear deterrence against state 
and non-state sponsored terrorism.  Furthermore, this study analyzes the impact that 
contemporary French nuclear strategy may have on world events, United States (U.S.) 
foreign policy, and overall non-proliferation goals.  This shift in strategy may create 
potential problems, particularly for the U.S., in the areas of nuclear proliferation, 
alliance cohesion and nuclear strategy within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the foreign and security policy of the European Union (EU) and future 
transatlantic cooperation between France and the U.S.   
C.  IMPORTANCE 
The issue of nuclear strategic doctrine and deterrence has re-energized a dilemma 
since the end of the Cold War.  That dilemma can be summed up in the question: “What 
deterrent role and usefulness can nuclear weapons have against current and existing 
threats, and what are the most effective means to implement a nuclear deterrent strategy.  
Since 2001, the threat of nuclear terrorism has added a unique twist to the threat and 
capability for many nuclear countries.  The importance of this thesis is to fill the gap in 
current writings and research concerning the viability of the French nuclear deterrent 
strategy against terrorism, whether state or non-state sponsored.  Additionally, this work 
will provide policy makers, students and faculty with a more in-depth look at the past and 
present strategic thought and practice of French nuclear policy in order to provide 
theoretical guidance and potential strategies (based on the French model) which may be 
useful to the U.S. and its allies and could be considered for future nuclear doctrine.  
Moreover, due to the strategic friction between France and the United States since the 
inception of NATO in 1948, and more recently since the invasion of Iraq, further 
scholarly attention is a must to identify motives, sources, and policies that may help to 
4 
enlist France to aid the goals of U.S. policy generally, and, in the process, perhaps to 
avoid some of the worst pitfalls of misbegotten policy and strategy as have episodically 
beset Franco-American relations in the last half century and more.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
1. Survey of Prior Work  
When placing France at the forefront of this discussion, it is relevant to note that 
scholars have accorded French nuclear deterrence a secondary role in analyses compared 
to more prominent Cold War strategies such as mutually assured destruction (MAD) and 
flexible response, to say nothing of Soviet nuclear strategy.  Additionally, historians, 
strategists, academics and policy-makers as well as political scientists classified France as 
a second-tier power which maintained a minimal deterrence against the Soviet Union 
within the Cold War context. This theme ranked as inferior in theoretical or policy 
relevance than that of, say, the nuclear concepts of the Soviet Union or Great Britain.  
Leading scholars have chosen to address the political and ideological issues surrounding 
France’s desire for nuclear weapons and the “grandeur” associated with them, its desire 
for autonomy and independence based on Gaullist thinking, and the discord these issues 
have created within the transatlantic relationship, rather than the legitimacy and 
functionality of the French doctrine.2  This is not to say that French doctrine has been 
totally ignored, but more accurately de-emphasized, due to the primacy of bipolarity 
during the Cold War.  This same sentiment has also pervaded the post-Cold War era in 
which terrorism, non-proliferation and conventional regional conflict have overshadowed 
strategic nuclear thought, however, these same issues have now factored regional nuclear 
strategies into the analysis and several sources have contributed to an increasing body of 
literature concerning not only nuclear doctrine in general, but more specifically 
developments in French nuclear deterrence.  This body of literature concentrates 
primarily on the political, ideological and historical settings that existed during the 
development and implementation of French strategy as well as the potential results of the 
                                                 
2 For further references on France’s Cold War nuclear strategy and capabilities see, Wilfrid L Kohl, 
French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971); Lawrence Freedman, The 
Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Henry D. Sokolski, ed. Getting 
Mad: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins And Practice [book on-line] (The Strategic Studies 
Institute Publications Office, U.S. Army War College, 2004), http://www.npec-
web.org/Books/GettingMAD.pdf (accessed June 16, 2006). 
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doctrine, rather than in-depth analysis of the usefulness and viability of the current 
strategy.3 
The scholarly literature on this subject falls into three broad categories: the 
political and strategic history of the Cold War to include the basis and foundations for 
nuclear deterrent strategy; the challenges to French nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold 
War period; and finally, evolving nuclear strategic theory with regard to nuclear terrorism 
and conventional weapons of mass destruction.  Thus, Wilfrid L. Kohl provides a 
comprehensive and detailed account of French nuclear diplomacy during the Cold War 
with emphasis on the political and ideological aspects of French policy, and Jonathan 
Mercer evaluates the role of reputation and prestige within international affairs, with 
obvious repercussions for the topic.4  Lawrence Freedman provides a thorough history of 
the evolution of nuclear strategy from its inception through the end of the Cold War.5  
Philip Gordon and Anand Menon, moreover, ties nuclear strategic thought together with 
the history and politics which shaped French nuclear strategy and policy.6  The works of 
these prominent scholars provide the historical and strategic foundation for this thesis.  
Three specialist have written, in particular, on the evolution of French doctrine 
since the end of the Cold War: David Yost, in 2006 a visiting professor at the NATO 
Defense College in Rome and a Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey 
California; French political scientist Bruno Tertrais of the Strengthening the Global 
Partnership Project; and Pascal Boniface, Director of the Institute for International and 
Strategic Relations (IRIS).  Literature on the history of French nuclear forces and 
doctrine provides valuable information on the processes, technology and concepts, as 
well as the international and domestic events which have contributed to the shaping of 
                                                 
3 A valid strategy in this case would be considered one that has a theoretical foundation based on 
realistic expectations supported by factual data, academic thought, and political and military capabilities. 
4 Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy; Jonathon Mercer. Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). 
5 Lawrence Freedman. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
6 Philip H. Gordon. A Certain Idea of France (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); 
Anand Menon. France, NATO and the Limits of Independence 1981-97 (New York: St. Martin Press, Inc., 
2000). 
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French doctrine since the end of the Cold War.7  These writings build a clear picture of 
previous French nuclear policy and what has prompted new and evolving strategies and 
doctrine.  This literature provides commentary on the current strategy and highlights 
many of the elements of the doctrine which President Chirac has spoken about since the 
late 1990’s.  Furthermore, this literature brings out the continued elements of the doctrine 
which have been a continuing part of the overall strategy since the early 1990’s.  It also 
supplies significant data on public opinion, economics, political issues and world events 
that not only influence French policy-makers but have a decisive role in the development 
of strategy.  Moreover, the literature on the subject provides several dissenting 
viewpoints and supporting arguments, providing a sounding board for concerns that have 
been voiced about the new doctrine.  Additionally, the research highlights the shift 
toward a doctrine more similar to the United States strategy and brings out the 
congruence of both countries vision on the use and maintenance of nuclear power and 
forces. 
Nuclear deterrence in general and its legitimacy against terrorism or “rogue” 
states, which may supply terrorist organizations, has received considerable attention 
recently.  T. V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett, and James J. Wirtz have compiled considerable 
knowledge concerning the debate on the future of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War 
era.8  This compilation of writings tends to focus on the international order after the Cold 
War, new and emerging nuclear states and a comprehensive discussion about the 
legitimacy of minimal deterrence.  Research and theoretical arguments by Jasen J. 
Castillo, a political scientist with the RAND Corporation, and Michael A. Levi, a nuclear 
physicist with the Brookings Institution, postulate the continued value of nuclear 
deterrence in an age of terrorism and provide important insight into strategic and 
                                                 
7 For a comprehensive analysis on the evolution of the French nuclear deterrent strategy since the end 
of the cold war, cf. David S. Yost. "France's Nuclear Dilemmas." Foreign Affairs 75:1 (1996), 108–20; 
idem. "France’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy." Survival 47:3 (2005), 117-146; idem. “France’s New Nuclear 
Doctrine,” International Affairs 82:4 (2006), 701-721; Bruno Tertrais. “Nuclear policy: France Stands 
Alone,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 60:04 (2004), 48-55, 
http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=ja04tertrais (accessed June 3, 2006); idem. Nuclear Policies 
in Europe (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999); Pascal Boniface. “The Future of the French 
Nuclear Posture.” Strategic Analysis 23:8, (November 1999), http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_.html 
(accessed July 20, 2006). 
8 T.V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett and James J. Wirtz, eds. The Absolute Weapon Revisited; Nuclear 
Arms and the Emerging International Order (University of Michigan, 1998). 
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technical thought which has considerable application to the topic of French nuclear 
deterrent strategy.9  Additionally, these works provide the necessary background and 
critical thinking to help guide technological and policy decision for the future.   
Such works share one important feature: they all discuss the general evolution of 
nuclear deterrent strategy and can be applied directly into the discussion and evaluation 
of the French of strategic thought and the validity of nuclear deterrence continues to have 
value in the post-Cold War era, but not without implications that need to be addressed on 
different policy levels.     
2. Major Debates 
 From these writings there are three main arguments which emerge. The first of 
the debates concerning the new French doctrine revolves around the concern of 
broadening strategic criteria and lowering the threshold for the combat use of nuclear 
weapons.  President Chirac included in his address that one of France’s vital interests 
now includes “strategic supplies” in addition to territories and surrounding areas vital to 
national integrity.  These policy statements have effectively included a wide range of 
assets and energy sources that would require the President to make far reaching decisions 
on their value and the ultimate use of nuclear weapons.  Contributing to this is new 
technology which will allow French nuclear forces the capability to employ a weapon 
with more control and a less-devastating effect.  Critics of the new doctrine argue that the 
combined effect of broadening the criteria for the use of nuclear weapons and 
development of new technologies allowing more ease of use has lowered the threshold to 
which nuclear weapons may be used.10  Supporters of the new doctrine argue instead that 
by making nuclear capabilities more controllable and widening the assets to be protected, 
such a policy will deter aggressors even more.  This sentiment was reinforced in a 
Financial Times article that stated, “the greater the prospect of France being able to limit 
                                                 
9 Jasen J. Castillo. “Nuclear Terrorism: Why Deterrence Still Matters,” Current History, 659, 
(December 2003), http://www.currenthistory.com/org_pdf_files/102/668/102_668_426.pdf  (accessed 
September 07, 2006); Michael A. Levi,. “Deterring Nuclear Terrorism,”.” Issues in Science and 
Technology 20:3 (Spring 2004), 70-74, http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/levi/20040401.htm  
(accessed August 10, 2006). 
10 Yost, “New Nuclear Doctrine,” 701-721. 
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the scope of a nuclear strike, the greater the chance of a French president daring to order 
one, and therefore the greater the potential deterrent effect of the force de frappe.”11   
This debate fuels the second significant argument concerning the new French 
doctrine which centers on the importance of nuclear weapons as a key component of 
national security.  In President Chirac’s speech, he clearly indicated France’s need for 
and continued support of a nuclear strategy and arsenal when he stated: 
In the face of the crises that shake the world, in the face of new 
threats, France has always first chosen the road of prevention.  It 
remains, in all its forms, the very basis of our defense policy. . . To 
be heard, one must also, when necessary, be able to use force.  We 
must therefore have an important capacity to intervene beyond our 
frontiers with conventional means in order to uphold and complete 
this strategy.  Such a defense policy relies on the certainty that, 
whatever happens, our vital interests will be protected.  That is the 
role assigned to nuclear deterrence, which is directly in keeping with 
the continuity of our strategy of prevention.  It constitutes its 
ultimate expression.12 
 
With this statement many feel that the need for, and acquisition of a nuclear capability, 
has been accentuated.  Critics argue that current non-proliferation goals have been 
diminished due to the stated importance of nuclear weapons by a regional power and this 
contradicts efforts to downgrade their importance and promote nuclear nonproliferation 
and disarmament.  Supporters of the strategy say that highlighting the nuclear option  will 
actually be helpful in negotiations with states trying to acquire nuclear assets, such as 
Iran.  These same supporters claim that the strategy signifies the willingness of a 
European state to consider actions outside the purview of the United States’, which may 
ultimately influence potential nuclear-ambitious nations at the bargaining table.13  
The third major debate concerning the new French strategy centers on the 
usefulness of nuclear deterrence against non-state and state-sponsored terrorism.  One of 
                                                 
11 John Thornhill and Peter Spiegel. “Relevance of ‘force de frappe’ to terrorist age,” Financial Times, 
(January 20, 2006). 
http://search.ft.com/searchArticle?page=2&queryText=nuclear+deterrence&y=0&javascriptEnabled=true&
id=060120000865&x=0 (accessed May 30, 2006)  
12 Jacques Chirac (speech,  Strategic Air and Maritime Forces at Landivisiau / L'Ile Longue, France, 
January 19, 2006)  
13 Yost, “New Nuclear Doctrine,” 701-721. 
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the primary questions is: “is nuclear deterrence effective against non-state actors?”  
Virtually all the literary sources agree that nuclear deterrence is not useful against 
terrorist organizations.  The larger question from this debate is that of state sponsorship.  
How can France guarantee significant proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, of ties between 
terrorist actions and state sponsorship?  Granted the somewhat mixed record of such 
issues in the prelude to the 2003 campaign against Iraq, critics argue that faulty 
intelligence and/or manipulation may lead to a nuclear strike without solid justification.  
Such a strike would be devastating to international order and potentially spark a backlash 
resulting in a major theater war or even a “clash of civilizations.”  Proponents of the 
strategy argue that intelligence sources are capable of discerning verifiable linkages 
between terrorist organizations and state sponsors. More importantly, they argue that the 
threat of nuclear retaliation is enough to dissuade would-be state sponsorship of terrorist 
actions.  However, if those states have an established nuclear arsenal, a major dilemma 
could unfold that would severely challenge French leaders and the world community.  
These arguments will most certainly affect many of the political and strategic 
developments within Europe and in the international community. 
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
1. Case Study 
This is a single case study of French nuclear doctrine applying a longitudinal 
evolutionary analysis that ranges form the Cold War and its evolution throughout the 
1990’s up to the present.  A content analysis of public speeches by President Jacques 
Chirac will provide the foundation and will be used to highlight the philosophy and 
rationale, approaches and concerns of French strategic thinking.  The analysis will focus 
primarily on French doctrine, but will include comparisons to other strategic nuclear 
doctrines to address specific issues related to nuclear deterrent strategy.  Additionally, a 
thorough review of policy will provide unique and specific information that will further 
highlight the issues concerning the new French doctrine as well as reveal issues that may 
impact policy, public opinion and future strategic doctrine. 
2. Sources 
The historical case study of the evolution of French nuclear strategy will rest on a 
thorough evaluation of scholarly books and academic journal articles specifically 
10 
discussing the transformation of doctrines, but also the decisive influence on them.  
Additionally, a survey of newspapers will also be used to extract material from several 
different perspectives that will further highlight the topic within a historical context.  
Studies have been published that contain very specific and detailed information about 
nuclear strategy and doctrine, in particular the French case, as well as the British and 
American postures, including discussions of future developments.  David Yost, the 
foremost American expert on French nuclear developments, has provided this writer with 
many of his own articles from French, American and NATO academic and professional 
journals.  These articles discuss in detail the evolution of French nuclear doctrine and the 
pertinent implications and events that have helped shape French strategy and capabilities 
since the end of the Cold War.  Along with this information, on-line sources offer an 
abundance of resources that discuss the many related issues that have shaped the doctrine 
as well as their practical applications, political and economic limitations, and 
commentary concerning the possible outcomes of new doctrine and the limitations and 





                                                  
14 For on-line information on French nuclear deterrence see, Pascal Boniface,Bonfiace. “French 
Nuclear Weapons Policy after the Cold War,” The Atlantic Council of the United States (August 1998), 
http://www.acus.org/docs/9808-French_Nuclear_Weapons_Policy_After_Cold_War.pdf  (accessed 
September 15, 2006); Martin Butcher, Otfried Nassauer and Stephen Young,. “Nuclear Futures: Western 
European Options for Nuclear Risk Reduction,” British American Security Information Council and the 
Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BASICBITS) 98.6 (December 1998), 
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/1998nuclearfutures1.htmhttp://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/19
98nuclearfutures1.htm (accessed September 09, 2006); Felix Arteaga, “French Nuclear Deterrence 
According to President Chirac: Reform, Clean Break or Reminder?” Real Instituno Elcano, (January 24, 
2006), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/905.asp (accessed September 11, 2006); Oliver Meier,. 
“Chirac Outlines Expanded Nuclear Doctrine,” Arms Control Today (March 2006), 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_03/MARCH-chirac.asp (accessed September 12, 2006). Electronic 







F.  CHAPTER SUMMARY   
1. Chapter II: France’s Cold War Nuclear Deterrent Strategy, A 
Historical Review 
This chapter will provide an overview of French nuclear development and 
strategy from its inception in the late 1950’s through the end Cold War.  The primary 
issues discussed will be General Charles de Gaulle’s influence in shaping French nuclear 
doctrine and the legacy of this influence on subsequent administrations and nuclear 
strategy.  The foundations and influences on French nuclear strategy will be highlighted 
and an overall analysis of nuclear strategy during the Cold War will be the main 
objective.   
2. Chapter III:  Evolution of French Nuclear Strategy beyond the Cold 
War 
This chapter will outline the adjustments to French nuclear strategy following the 
Cold War to present day.  An analysis of two speeches concerning nuclear strategy given 
by President Jacque Chirac will provide the impetus for determining France’s current 
nuclear strategy and its justification and rationale.  The primary goal of this analysis will 
be to highlight the continuities with previous Gaullist strategies and point out the 
evolutionary elements that have become a central part of France’s nuclear doctrine. 
3. Chapter IV:  Viability of the French Nuclear Strategy 
This chapter will give a broader assessment for the justification of French nuclear 
strategy based on an evolving and changing international environment.  Within this 
context, the validity of nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War will be discussed and its 
relevance will be established.  Based upon the relevance of deterrence, an analysis of 
nuclear deterrence against state and non-state sponsored terrorism will attempt to show 
the validity of the French nuclear doctrine and the potential spill-over effects it may have 
on future deterrence capabilities.  Additionally, weaker elements of the strategy will be 
addressed and specific technological and policy advancements will be indicated that may 
strengthen France’s deterrent doctrine.  An analysis of the ability and credibility of 





4. Chapter V:  Conclusion  
This chapter will provide an overview of the validity of the French doctrine and 
its relevance to the international situation.  The primary focus will be to draw upon the 
relevant issues described in the paper to produce future policy and recommendations.  
Additionally, a brief section will discuss these relevant findings in relation the United 
States foreign policy and nuclear strategy. 
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II. FRANCE’S COLD WAR NUCLEAR DETERRENT 
STRATEGY, A HISTORICAL REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
After the defeat in 1940 and the agony of German occupation during World War 
II, then the subsequent defeat in Indochina in 1954 and in Suez in 1956, France’s 
international political clout and stature had endured several severe set backs that left a 
deep imprint on domestics politics and international relations.15  This situation 
particularly held true for France’s status within NATO, Europe, and the vanishing 
colonial territories.  France’s standing within international circles had taken a back seat to 
the politics of the era.  Because of the bi-polar scenario which played out during the Cold 
War between the United States and the Soviet Union, second-tier countries such as 
France enjoyed much less attention and latitude of action.  Additionally, the rearmament 
and economic recovery of Germany took center stage within the Alliance, and the fear of 
German hegemony within Europe loomed heavy in the French psyche.  The result of 
these circumstances contributed to the fall of the Fourth Republic and helped usher in a 
new and more assertive Fifth Republic under the leadership of General Charles de Gaulle 
in 1959.  Although de Gaulle is credited with the inception of the force de frappe 
(striking force), its origins date back to the turbulent early 1950s.16  During this time, 
“several politicians, officials, and military officers saw nuclear weapons as the key to 
restoring France’s prestige and international political respect, and as the necessary 
                                                 
15 For further material on France’s declining international status and the effects of these events, see  
Philip H. Gordon,. A Certain Idea of France (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Wilfrid L 
Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971); Anand Menon,. 
France, NATO and the Limits of Independence 1981-97 (New York: St. Martin Press, Inc., 2000). For an 
American perspective on the impact of these events on France’s stature, see John Lamberton Harper, 
American visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F.  Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson (Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
 16 The term force de frappe was not an original phrase coined by General de Gaulle.  It was first used 
by military planners during deterrent planning studies under French Chief of Staff, General Paul Ely in 
1956.  Although the term predates General De Gaulle, it became the generally accepted term used in the 
press for the French strategic nuclear forces.  The official designation of the French nuclear force is force 
nucléaire stratégique which is also synonymous with force de dissuasion (deterrent power). 
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prerequisite for an independent foreign policy.”17  These sentiments led to the initial 
steps toward a French nuclear capability and ultimately the development of a French 
nuclear program. 
1. A Nuclear France: Inception of the force de frappe 
The French nuclear program started during the Fourth Republic, immediately 
following World War II.  The Commissariat à L'Énergie Atomique (CEA) was 
established as a civilian atomic energy agency in order to support the scientific and 
industrial application of nuclear power.18  It was not until 1954 that military applications 
for atomic energy were considered, but under the unpredictable and unstable nature of the 
political system of the Fourth Republic, no official directives were issued for a military 
nuclear program.  Lower level technocrats and military officers led the development and 
studies of nuclear capabilities, without a clear mandate from the French government.  
Interest in military nuclear capabilities began to gain importance toward the end of the 
Forth Republic when “Moscow’s acquisition of long-range strategic missiles marked a 
sudden change in the strategic relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union by 
demonstrating the vulnerability of American territory to possible Soviet atomic attack.”19  
No longer was America’s geographic location considered a safe haven. This meant that 
the United States’ willingness to provide a nuclear guarantee that protected Europe from 
a Soviet attack had become less credible and “increased the strength of French arguments 
for diminishing their country’s reliance on the American nuclear guarantee”.20  Along 
with this strategic development, French thinking on nuclear armament was influenced by 
the famous 1957 British White Paper of Duncan Sandys which concluded, “There is no 
effective way to defend Great Britain except by a British nuclear deterrent.”21 The 
general crux of the argument was that the United States might not employ its nuclear 
                                                 
17 Wilfrid L. Kohl, “The French Nuclear Deterrent,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science. 
29:2, (November, 1968), 81. 
18 The Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1945 during the Forth Republic instituted to 
develop all applications of atomic energy, both civilian and military.  The CEA is headed by the high-
commissioner for atomic energy and by a board headed by the general administrator.  It conducts 
fundamental and applied research into many areas, including the design of nuclear reactors. 
19 Kohl, “French Nuclear Deterrent,” 81. 
20 Ibid., 81-82. 
21 Kohl, “French Nuclear Diplomacy,” 40. 
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weapons in the event of an attack if the Soviet Union could directly attack the United 
States with reprisal strikes.  These developments and the assessment of the British 
provided even further justification for a national nuclear program.  Under the Fourth 
Republic (1944-1958), the vision of a national nuclear program “was to be used to bolster 
France’s security and political position with the NATO framework and not independently 
of it as General de Gaulle later directed.”22 In the interval, however, the Suez disaster in 
the fall of 1956 devalued such an alliance oriented nuclear concept and opened the door 
to a radical change of policy that took shape with the Fifth Republic two years later.  The 
answer was re-nationalization of defense.  
It was not until the spring of 1958 and the inception of the Charles de Gaulle 
Presidency that a fully recognized and supported nuclear program began to take shape.  
From the fall of 1958 until the end of 1960, and the first successful nuclear test, de Gaulle 
strongly supported the development of a nuclear program and made it a top priority for 
his government.  After a lengthy and heated political debate between opposition parties, 
and subsequent rejections of the program by the Senate, the nuclear program became law 
on December 6, 1960, despite failing to receive an absolute majority vote as laid out in 
the Constitution of the Fifth Republic.  As a top CEA official remarked, “the advent of 
the Fifth Republic transformed the character of French atomic development by the 
decision of the government to give priority to the first bomb, but also to a true program of 
studies and, later on, to the production of perfected atomic weapons.”23  Although a 
consensus on the program was far from being reached, the French nuclear program had 
been officially born and enacted into a governmentally sanctioned program.   The 
authorization of the nuclear program and the successful nuclear test laid the foundation 
for the diplomacy that General de Gaulle would use to influence international politics. 
2. “Grandeur” and Independence: Revival of French Power in Europe 
at the end of the 1950s 
Any discussion on French nuclear strategy would be incomplete without first 
some generalization about the role that national independence and grandeur has played in 
the development of French strategic thought within the trans-Atlantic system of states 
                                                 
22 Kohl, “French Nuclear Deterrent,” 82. 
23 Kohl, “French Nuclear Diplomacy,” 82. 
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since the late 1940s.  These two elements stem from a French strategic culture deeply 
imbedded in history coupled with a personal obsession of de Gaulle which has had a 
lasting legacy in French society and national security policy until the present. Such policy 
was that of those French who refused to accept the putative judgment of the mid-
twentieth century that France was damned to an ancillary role in the fate of Europe and 
its former empire.  Such policy reflected an attempt to use the ideal and application of 
power as a means to heal the domestic rupture that had burdened French politics since the 
mid-1930s and to assert the rank of France in the face of a revived West Germany, as 
well as a UK linked with the US.   Grandeur for the French citizen means greatness and 
prestige within the context of great projects, or “vastes enterprises”.24   According to 
Philip Gordon, “the French feel they are destined to play leading global and European 
roles and are loath to renounce them.”25   
The concept of grandeur emanates from the French experiences during the  
Barock period, as well as the Enlightenment and the imperial  heritage in the late 1800’s 
and early 1900’s, in which “for more than two hundred years, (since the French 
revolution, if not since the time of Louis XIV) the idea of playing the role of nation phare 
had tempted the French, and history had given them a sense of national importance in 
international affairs,” as indicated by Gordon in his book A Certain Idea of France.26  
Striving for grandeur and political prestige has imbedded itself in the consciousness of 
French politics.  Notwithstanding the events of the Second World War, this theme has 
been a constant in French political culture and remains into the twenty-first century.  The 
idea of grandeur and its significance within French politics became a central theme for 
General de Gaulle in the early 1960s, and a cornerstone of his strategic vision and 
justification for a French nuclear program until 1969 and thereafter.  However, prestige 
and grandeur within an international system also requires a level of independence which 
enables a nation to take autonomous action.  The manner in which the makers of U.S. 
                                                 
24 Kohl, “French Nuclear Diplomacy,” 127; Gordon, “Idea of France,” 18; Menon, “Limits of 
Independence,” 16. 
25 Gordon, “Idea of France,” 17. 
26 Ibid., 18. 
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policy had slighted the French from 1940, but especially in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
bulked large in such an idea.   
Granted this policy, independence was a prerequisite for grandeur.  As Gordon 
points out, “the two notions can be analyzed together not because they are 
interchangeable but because they were so integrally related to one another.”27   The 
general feeling within France after World War II was that France had lost some of its 
independence and become dependent on the United States and later NATO for its 
security.  In no small part, the events of World War II left the French politically and 
militarily dependent on an Anglo-Saxon alliance which continued to reduce the status of 
France in the international system.  This scenario was in stark contrast to the “golden 
years” of French power in the reign of Louis XIV, in the revolutionary and Napoleonic 
period as well as at the height of the imperialist period in Africa and Asia until 1914.  In 
the French mind, “France had a special right and duty to play the role of a world power 
simply because it was France.”  In order completely to realize this goal, it was dependent 
upon France’s ability to act independently in international affairs.  Accordingly, this 
independence could not be attained if others provided for the security of France or 
influenced its policies.  As the British scholar Anand Menon indicates: 
France could only aspire to grandeur if it exercised ultimate control over 
its own foreign policy.  National independence, in other words, constituted 
an essential basis of the quest for international standing.  Independence 
required France to remain free of any kind of ‘subordination’ that could 
prevent the decision-making bodies of the state from basing their decisions 
primarily on a consideration of French interests.”28   
 
Arguably, the interests of the Anglo-Saxons were not necessarily the interests of France, 
and this simple fact detracted from France’s ability to act independently.  Independence 
therefore became intertwined with grandeur as a necessary component and guiding 
principle for the French state.  These nationalistic sentiments became the backbone for 
the Gaullist vision of France and the primary reasoning behind nuclear ambitions and 
policies during the Cold War. 
 
                                                 
27 Gordon, “Idea of France,” 18. 
28 Menon, “Limits of Independence,” 17. 
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3. Nationalism on a Nuclear Level 
Grandeur and independence in the French case predate de Gaulle himself, but 
these two notions were central in the case of the French nuclear program at the beginning 
of the Fifth Republic in the late 1950s.  De Gaulle resurrected these notions and 
developed them into a vision unique to France in the 1960s and his ideas have shown 
remarkable durability long after his death, despite a radically changed international 
environment.  This vision stemmed from the experiences de Gaulle made during the 
inter-war years and World War II combined with his belief that the nation-state was the 
fundamental unit in world politics.  For de Gaulle, the nation-state was the only entity 
which could represent the people because it was the only political community that would 
serve the interests of society.29  Gordon points out the result of these beliefs and 
experiences when he states: 
He [de Gaulle] had seen the extent to which dependence on Great Britain 
had cost France between the two world wars when a lack of British support 
and diverging British and French interests had constrained France and led to 
her demise.  It was thus not surprising that the post World War II 
dependence on the United States evoked bitter memories and not surprising 
that de Gaulle, the statesman, pursued uniquely national goals first.30 
 
These viewpoints stood out in de Gaulle’s presidency and his international politics, 
particularly with the issue of nuclear armament.  So much so, that they could be 
considered the primary justification for a French nuclear arsenal which would then 
solidify independence.  Speaking about nuclear weapons, and alluding perhaps to the 
secondary status of Germany,  de Gaulle highlighted the essential nature of nuclear arms 
in the Cold War era: “a great state which does not possess them, while others have them, 
does not dispose of its own destiny.”31  Clearly de Gaulle realized that in order for France 
to be taken seriously within the Atlantic Alliance, or the rest of the world for that matter, 
he needed an independent policy. Understandably, for de Gaulle, nuclear weapons 
became the cornerstone of national power and an indispensable ingredient and political 
                                                 
29 Kohl, “French Nuclear Deterrent,” 85. 
30 Gordon, “Idea of France,” 17. 
31 Kohl, “French Nuclear Deterrent,” 85. 
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instrument in the quest for grandeur, the fundamental objective of his foreign policy.32  
In the search for grandeur, an independent French nuclear force provided the foundation 
for an independent foreign policy.  De Gaulle successfully combined these nationalist 
sentiments with the desire for a nuclear force, the result being French nationalism built on 
the foundations of nuclear capability. 
From its inception during the de Gaulle presidency in 1958, the French force de 
frappe had a strong political focus which aimed not only to provide security for France 
but more importantly to gain international political clout as well as to serve a source of 
national pride that would eradicate domestic political divisions that had endured from the 
1930s into the 1960s.  This is not to say that strategically France’s nuclear program was 
insignificant, but more accurately that the political goals strongly shaped the nuclear 
program.  T. V. Paul supported this assessment when he wrote:  
France especially acquired nuclear weapons on the conviction that these 
capabilities would endow them with a major say in the security affairs of 
allies and adversaries alike.  Although the declared purpose of nuclear 
capability was a mini-deterrent against the Soviet threat, the larger rationale 
for nuclear acquisition was political in character.  They believed that by 
developing a nuclear capability, they would gain strategic independence 
from the United States and insurance in case Washington did not live up to 
its security promises.33 
 
Therefore, nuclear weapons would provide the means to gain increased political influence 
compared to non-nuclear states and guard against the possibility that the United States 
would not provide an umbrella of protection for France.  According to Thomas 
Freedman, “the French characterized the US nuclear guarantee as being a flimsy 
foundation for security, much inferior to a national effort.”34  De Gaulle recalled with 
bitterness instances of perfidious British and U.S. behavior as concerned alliance 
cohesion during the past war and in the wake of the wars of colonial succession in 
Indochina and North Africa. The quest for nuclear independence and a widening rift in 
the trans-Atlantic alliance relationship and NATO would result in France’s complete shift 
                                                 
32 Kohl, “French Nuclear Deterrent,” 85. 
33 Paul et al., “Absolute Weapon,” 33. 
34 Freedman, “Evolution of Strategy,” 298. 
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toward an independent and national nuclear force separate from the Anglo-Saxons, i.e. 
the British and the U.S.  
De Gaulle had been critical of the Fourth Republic’s acceptance of the United 
States dominion over European affairs and France’s dependency on them for her security.  
The Fourth Republic, “whilst anxious to ensure an American presence in Europe to 
counter the Soviet threat…attempted to secure a leading role for France within the 
nascent Atlantic Alliance.  They did so not least because the experience of the period 
between 1947 and 1949 had made them wary of the prospect of exclusion from what was 
increasingly perceived as ‘Anglo-Saxon’ club directing western security affairs.”35  
However, the hope of increasing France’s influence within the Alliance had been 
diminished by the action of both the American and the British during the creation of 
NATO in the period 1948-50.  As Menon points out, “France was excluded from the 
initial negotiations concerning the creation of the Atlantic Alliance, as London and 
Washington expressed fears that communist sympathizers in the French administration 
could leak their details to the Soviet Union.”36  Although France continued to insist on a 
tri-partite leadership role consistent with Article IX of the Treaty, British and American 
efforts continued to marginalize France’s influence creating a bitter resentment toward 
Anglo-Saxon bias in the security interests of Europe.  This resentment and the unease 
created by greater and greater American influence continued to increase tensions within 
the Alliance.  These tensions reached a boiling point during the Suez crisis of 1956 when 
the United States abandoned support for British and French policies in the region and the 
Eisenhower administration openly forced a cease-fire on British and French forces 
through economic and political maneuvering.  For the French, “the American actions 
during the crisis heightened French doubts about the reliability of the U.S. as an ally and 
increased frustration with an Alliance, which, as Paris saw it, was run by the Americans 
on the basis solely of their own interests.”37  The continuing decline of French and 
Anglo-Saxon relationships within the alliance would further influence General de Gaulle 
                                                 
35 Menon, “Limits of Independence,” 8. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 9. 
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as he became president of the new Fifth Republic and set out on a course of open and 
assertive criticism of NATO and its lack of support for French interests.   
 As President, de Gaulle continued his attacks and criticism on NATO and its 
strategy.  Speaking at his first Defense Council meeting in 1958 he commented: 
Our place in the NATO organization must be reconsidered.  The 
Americans enjoy an overwhelming number of commands in the 
organization.  We are the victims of a completely unacceptable 
discrimination…We are completely left to one side when it comes to 
drawing up the plans for the SAC and the British bomber Command.  
[SACEUR] possesses military assets over whose use we have no say 
whatsoever.  We cannot accept such exclusivity concerning nuclear war, 
especially because our territory would be used.38 
 
Though, critical of NATO and American dominance in security affairs within Europe, de 
Gaulle maintained interest in nuclear assistance and cooperation with the United States 
on the emerging French nuclear program.  According to Wilfrid Kohl, “when he (de 
Gaulle) raised this subject at an early meeting with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 
the latter explained that France did not qualify for such assistance under the terms of the 
1958 amendments to the McMahon Act.”39 
            Not surprisingly, the rejection of American nuclear support and the 
marginalization of French interests with the alliance prompted de Gaulle to take action in 
the form of his now famous September 1958 memorandum to President Dwight 
Eisenhower.  In the memorandum he proposed an Anglo-French-American triumvirate to 
consult on global strategy and nuclear issues at the time of the Algerian war and the 
incipient nuclear sharing with the West Germans under SACEUR Lauris Norstad’s dual 
                                                 
38 Menon, p. 10; A prime example of the lack of French control and input  in NATO planning was 
illustrated during a meeting between SACEUR General Lauris Norstad and French President de Gaulle 
discussing the details of the deployment of NATO forces in France.  President de Gaulle asked to discuss 
the issue with Norstad in which the following transpired:  “Norstad agreed, and made an extremely brilliant 
exposition with his inter-allied staff in attendance.   After congratulating him, the head of the French 
government asked the American general for a precise account of the deployment of nuclear weapons in 
France and of the targets assigned to them.  Norstad: ‘Sir, I can answer only if we are alone.’ ‘So bet it,’ 
said de Gaulle.  The two staffs withdrew.  ‘So then?’ ‘ Then, sir, I cannot reply to your questions, to my 
very great regret… .’ And de Gaulle in conclusion: ‘General, that is the last time, and make yourself 
understand it, that a responsible French leader will allow such an answer to be made.’” Robert S. Jordan. 
Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander (New York: St. Martin’s Press, inc., 2000), 122. 
39 Kohl, “French Nuclear Deterrent,” 82. 
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use policy.40  This directoire would have undermined the NATO alliance, especially the 
FRG.  The memorandum threatened the curtailment of France’s NATO participation until 
the committee was established and the terms of the memorandum met.  It proposed “a 
pooling of atomic secrets and technical resources and the establishment of combined 
commands for operational theaters throughout the world.  De Gaulle also demanded, in 
effect, a veto right over the use of Anglo-Saxon nuclear weapons anywhere on the 
globe.”41  Needless to say, de Gaulle’s efforts were ineffectual and rejected by the United 
States.  Only limited consultation between France, Britain, and the United States arose 
from the memorandum.  According to Menon, “there is good reason to believe that this 
failure led the General to consider a fundamental re-evaluation of French relations with 
NATO.”42  These sentiments ultimately led de Gaulle to begin a phased pull-out of 
French forces from NATO’s integrated military structure in March 1959, first with the 
removal of elements of the French Navy from the integrated structure.  NATO’s shift 
toward the strategic concept of Flexible Response, French interests once again seemed 
subservient to British and American interests. The French came to believe that the NATO 
emphasis on a conventional build-up in central Europe to raise the nuclear threshold with 
Flexible Response after 1961, was tantamount to the same kind of abandonment of 
continental Europe as had transpired when the RAF withdrew aircraft from the battle of 
France; when the U.S. had abandoned Strasbourg in 1944; when the British and U.S. had 
failed to relieve Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and so on.  According to Menon, “de Gaulle used 
such developments as evidence that not only was NATO unfairly dominated by the 
Americans, but that the latter, by raising the nuclear threshold, were reducing the 
reliability of their guarantee to Europe.”43  Meanwhile, the French nuclear program 
continued to make progress and with its readiness assured, President de Gaulle, in 
February 1966, deeply dissatisfied with France’s position in NATO and Anglo-Saxon 
dominance, announced the final measures (i.e. the closure of U.S. facilities in France and 
the NATO headquarters, as well) to withdraw from the integrated military structure, 
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while enabling France to pursue an independent strategy and autonomy within Europe.44   
During the press conference announcing the withdrawal, “he emphasized that, whilst 
remaining loyal to the Atlantic Alliance, France felt that NATO no longer fulfilled its 
role and represented a dangerous constraint.”45  With this strategic autonomy, France 
developed a nuclear deterrent strategy with four primary objectives which fit into its 
desired political and strategic goals as well as their economic and technical constraints.  
These objectives were preventing war, primarily deterring major-power threats; 
maintaining national independence and decision-making autonomy; protecting the 
nation’s vital interests; and making an indirect contribution to the security of France’s 
allies.46  Each of these goals and the political and military foundations of the nuclear 
program were shaped by French thinkers who sought to expand nuclear deterrence theory 
and build upon France’s unique strategic situation. 
B. FRENCH STRATEGIC THOUGHT AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY 
Apart from the political aspects of France’s nuclear ambitions, strategically 
France maintained a distinctive and autonomous doctrine, in contrast, to say, the U.K. 
and West Germany.  In very general terms, French nuclear deterrence throughout the 
Cold War could be characterized as a minimal deterrent which relied heavily on counter-
value targeting against population centers, an “anti-cities” strategy. Such a policy had 
been considered in the U.S. as well, but eschewed in favor of overkill and nuclear plenty 
in the face of perceived Soviet strengths, also because of the inherent prolificacy of the 
U.S. defense system in the late-1950s and early-1960s (i.e. the missile gap).  Due to its 
economic, political, and technical restraints, France was limited in its ability to compete 
in sheer numbers of weapons and targeting capabilities with either the United States or 
the Soviet Union. This strategy was also driven by the limited accuracy and delivery 
capabilities of French nuclear weapons.  Only a small portion of the enemy order of battle 
would be destroyed in a conflict and such a counter-force strike would initiate an 
immediate retaliatory strike.   Writing in Défense’ Nationale, Guy Lewing expanded on 
the rationale behind this doctrine when he surmised: 
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We aim at the adversary’s cities because these targets are easy to reach, 
without great accuracy in the missiles required, and especially because one 
can thus cause important damage with a limited number of weapons. . . . It 
is only in the framework of an anti-cities strategy that the desirable level 
of damage can be guaranteed with the means that remain in proportion to 
the scientific, industrial, and economic possibilities of France. Any other 
strategy would necessitate much more important means, without doubt 
beyond our reach, and could not but weaken deterrence.47 
 
Two retired French Generals, Pierre Gallois and André Beaufre, were influential in 
building the foundations for French strategic thought throughout the early years of the 
force de frappe and this influence continues today.48  These principles had two distinct 
characteristics. First, they opposed the dominant trends in American strategic thought. 
Second, no similar plan emerged from British strategists who were seen to be in a like 
situation as France.49  The themes of these theories have resonated throughout French 
nuclear doctrine and influence general de Gaulle’s vision of independence and nuclear 
autonomy.  
1. The Theories of General Gallois 
General Pierre Gallois articulated several of the concepts and strategies which 
later became prevalent in the initial French nuclear doctrine.  Gallois strategic theories 
were based on his views concerning the fundamental change in warfare that nuclear 
weapons had created and several convictions about the nature of western democracies 
and alliances.  Many of these convictions were similar to those of General de Gaulle and 
were influential in shaping diplomatic policy and justification for the French nuclear 
program.  Additionally, many of Gallois’ theories shaped nuclear doctrine and became 
foundational principles for the French arsenal.  Ultimately, he developed an idealized 
logic of “pure” deterrence in which smaller nuclear powers could deter larger ones.  
Some of these theories consequently paralleled and influenced de Gaulle’s strategic 
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thinking and can be seen as guidelines for French strategy which have had broad and 
considerable longevity.  
a.  Nuclearization: Fundamental Changes in the Nature of War 
  In his earliest writings, Gallois emphasized the revolutionary changes in 
strategic thought that the advent of nuclear weapons imposed on possessors and non-
possessors of nuclear weapons.  According to his theories these changes had a profound 
impact on the underlying justification for nuclear weapons.  In parallel with Gaullist 
thoughts on nuclear weapons, Gallois felt that “those who possess nuclear weapons ‘hold 
the trump card for an active policy’.  Their allies had to be more cautious, and those 
without weapons or the prospect of a useful alliance were neutralist.”50   Gallois believed 
that “a nation with nuclear weapons, so long as they could deny the enemy the ability to 
destroy his retaliatory capacity, enjoyed ‘self-protection’, for no aggressor would launch 
an attack while there was a risk of serious retaliation.”51  Gallois believed in the ability to 
develop such a retaliatory capability and this belief led to the development of his strategic 
theories.   However, this belief also spawned several concerns for Gallois that would need 
to be addressed in order to produce a viable strategy and nuclear deterrent.   
The advent of the nuclear age, according to Gallois, profoundly changed 
the dynamics of war itself.  He was steadfast in his conviction that conventional might 
and deterrence were obsolete and would ultimately result in an escalation toward general 
nuclear war.  Based on this assumption he questioned the resoluteness and credibility of 
Western democracies and alliances.  His primary concern was that due to the increased 
pace of warfare and its eventual escalation, the use of nuclear weapons was unavoidable 
and the readiness of democracies to accept this eventuality was dubious.  In 1956 Gallois 
speculated, “in the event of a crisis, the allied nations, if they want to survive ought to 
rely on the resolution of the men charged with their defense…We are approaching the 
time when the menace will move faster than a mind can be made up.”52  His problem 
with Western democracies and their alliances was that they “were not made of stern 
                                                 




enough stuff.”53  For Gallois this brought into question the ‘will’ to support the principles 
of a valid nuclear deterrence and the resoluteness to be able to do what was necessary.  
According to Gallois: 
In principle, a determined policy of deterrence could solve all Western 
military problems.  If the potential assailant believed that even on the 
occasion of a conflict of secondary importance to himself, the opposing 
side would not hesitate, rather than surrender, to use its nuclear arsenal, he 
would have to abandon force as a means of persuasion.54 
Without the ‘will’ to uphold such a deterrent policy, Gallois believed that credibility was 
derived from political will and held the only means by which to gain the deterrent effect 
and fill this gap.  However, the problem with credibility was that it resided in the mind of 
the beholder rather that the one trying to create the impression for others.  In the pre-
nuclear age credibility could be gained from past military performance.  However, this 
did not exist in the nuclear age and speculation on future reactions was difficult to 
demonstrate against an adversary.  Gallois’ answer to this problem was to demonstrate a 
recklessness bordering on irrationality which would create a bluff.  However this bluff 
would be difficult to sustain.  Another answer was to base reactions on what would be at 
stake, but even this would be difficult to rationalize in relation to national interests.  The 
one point that could be supported was that retaliation was more likely following an attack 
on nation’s interests rather than on an allied party.55  For this reason, Gallois believed 
that the nation-state provided the only realistic means to respond to an attack, rather than 
an alliance.  Gordon points out that, “because the process—or better yet the threats—just 
described were based on matters of life and death, human and national, they could only 
be executed in a national context.” 56  Given these beliefs, Gallois developed his most 
influential concepts and ones that would be the backbone of French strategic thought for 
the remainder of the Cold War. 
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b.  The Nation-State and ‘Proportional Deterrence’ 
  Gallois’s two most influential strategic theories became acknowledged and 
official elements of French policy.  The first of these strategic visions played a major role 
in the justification of the French nuclear arsenal and virtually mirrored de Gaulle’s 
reasoning for the attainment of nuclear weapons.  Philip Gordon described Gallois 
concept as follows, “in an age of ballistic missiles, when all countries, large and small, 
are vulnerable to the thermonuclear destruction of their potential adversaries, no 
country—even the powerful United States—could be expected to engage in nuclear war 
for another.”57  Subsequently, this concept became one of the primary arguments in 
support of a national nuclear program.  As technology improved and nations could be 
attacked regardless of their geographic location, the “nuclear risks” outweighed the 
benefit.  Therefore, the responsibility for a nation’s security in the nuclear age could not 
be shared, and the nation-state provided the most reliable means to protect its own 
interests. 
  The second strategic theory, ‘proportional deterrence’, conceptualized by 
Gallois became the foundation for the French nuclear strategy.  In its simplest form, the 
theory provides for the deterrence of a large nuclear power by a smaller nuclear power.  
Gallois, in his influential work Balance of Terror, explained his theory as: “The 
thermonuclear force can be proportional to the value of the stake it is defending.”58  In 
essence the theory was based on a cost-benefit analysis in which the cost of an attack 
would not be worth the benefit of the target or territory.  Kohl clarifies this assessment 
when he states, “the basis of the theory is that a nation with a small atomic force can 
deter a great power (even though the latter has a far superior nuclear capability) because 
the amount of damage which even a small nuclear force could inflict would exceed the 
value to the great power of taking over or destroying the smaller state.”59  Although 
several criticisms of this theory have been noted, it nevertheless was accepted by de 
Gaulle and the Fifth Republic as the most realistic means of deterrence at the time, 
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allowing the French to move forward with their nuclear program.60  Additionally, the 
theory fit nicely with de Gaulle’s desire for an independent and autonomous nuclear 
strategy that was free of security ties to either the United States or Great Britain. 
2. The Theories of General Beaufre 
General André Beaufre had a much different views on nuclear deterrence than 
Gallois.  He did not share Gallois’ conclusions on ‘proportional deterrence’ and the 
decline of Massive Retaliation nor did he necessarily disagree with Flexible Response.61  
His theory revolved around the political and psychological impact that nuclear weapons 
produced and the stability that this effect could have on superpowers and alliance 
networks associated with them.  Compared to Gallois, Beaufre focused his theories on the 
“new and distinctive requirements imposed by a strategy of deterrence and the role he 
saw for local nuclear forces with this strategy.”62   He developed a deterrence theory 
based on model building that would prevent an enemy from making the decision to use 
armed force.  The result of this theory was a psychological deterrent created by “the 
combined effect of a calculation of the risk incurred compared to the issue at stake and of 
the fear engendered by the risks and uncertainties of conflict.”63  In order to attain this 
deterrent fear, Beaufre intertwined the national nuclear capability of European countries 
with alliance strength to produce a “multilateral deterrence.”  His sophisticated theory 
maintains parallels with French thinking of the mid-1960’s and was influential on 
Gaullist thought as France tried to maintain some alignment with NATO during the Cold 
War. 
a. Independent Nuclear Powers and “Multilateral Deterrence” 
Unlike Gallois, Beaufre was not averse to coordination with alliances such 
as NATO.  Quite the contrary, he felt that France’s independent nuclear contribution 
added a beneficial and important piece to the strength of the alliance.  The basis for this 
assessment had its origins in Beaufre’s conclusion that the balance created by the two 
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superpowers had actually reduced the credibility of nuclear deterrence.  As Kohl 
indicates, “Beaufre’s principle concern was that nuclear deterrence in Europe had become 
too stable, in view of the deterrent strength of NATO and the evolution that had led to 
less aggressive policies in the Soviet Union.”64  Due to this stability Beaufre concluded 
that “the threat of using nuclear weapons over a conflict in Europe had lost credibility for 
either superpower,” and he argued that “the uncertainty of a possible nuclear 
confrontation should be steeped up through the addition of other independent centers of 
nuclear decision-making.”65  In a 1965 article, Beaufre supported his theory and 
proposed that a level of uncertainty needed to be established to regain credible nuclear 
deterrence when he pointed out, “everything possible should be done to ensure that the 
threat should retain that minimum of spontaneous risk which leads to that prudence 
indispensable to the maintenance of peace.”66   
In order to create this state of uncertainty he proposed a coordinated 
framework of “multilateral deterrence” that would use several different methods and 
centers of decision-making simultaneously to destabilize the nuclear threat and increase 
deterrence.  His motivation lay in increasing the solidarity of the Alliance and thus 
increasing the deterrent capability; in essence France’s nuclear deterrent would increase 
the deterrent strength.  Lawrence Freedman wrote: 
Beaufre’s response to the growing incredibility of threats of nuclear 
retaliation was not to assert the greater plausibility of a purely national 
response or that conditions could be created in which a single decision on 
activating the deterrence threat could be made rational.  He could not even 
demonstrate how a multiplicity of decisions made nuclear use more likely, 
only that it added complexity to the enemy’s calculations.  The impact was 
felt through the psychology of uncertainty rather than the logic of 
certainty.  It was a threat that left a lot to chance, based on the danger of a 
situation getting out of control.  In this it was completely at variance with 
McNamara’s attempts to establish a capacity for measured escalation with 
every step under centralized control.67 
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The cornerstone of Beaufre’s argument, and a major departure from Gallois, was that 
nuclear credibility was enhanced by not acting alone, “that France’s tiny deterrent was 
most likely to work but only in the context of an alliance with a stronger nuclear 
power.”68  Therefore, a strategic relationship between two nuclear powers was preferable 
in that a middle nuclear power such as France could contribute to the overall force while 
simultaneously protecting national interests and providing a voice in international affairs, 
so long as its nuclear capability was sufficiently credible.  According to Gordon, “the 
stable nuclear balance of the superpowers had taken away the uncertainty necessary for 
effective Western deterrence; France’s additional ‘center of nuclear decision’ would 
bring it back.  By ‘intruding’ into a situation of bipolar nuclear equilibrium, the third 
party could have ‘strategic consequences out of all proportion to the [its] nuclear 
strength.’”69 Although Beaufre’s theory of “multilateral deterrence” was not supported by 
official French statements, it nevertheless had an influential impact on French strategy 
and its rationale. 
b. The French Nuclear “Trigger” 
One of the problems with the concept of “multilateral deterrence” was 
finding an appropriate mechanism in which the French nuclear force could be 
incorporated into a grander strategy.   From the logic of Beaufre’s theory arose the 
concept of a “nuclear trigger” in that France could be seen as a detonator for the NATO 
and American arsenal.  Wilfrid Kohl provides a theoretical scenario which helps explain 
this concept: 
If the Soviets threatened or actually began an invasion, France would 
threaten to use her atomic force.  Moscow would probably counter 
threaten the annihilation of France with Soviet missiles.  This, it is 
contended, would force the United States into a declaration of solidarity 
with France, if one had not been forthcoming already.  The uncertainty of 
this kind of chain of events actually occurring would be enough to deter 
the Russians form any attack, or threat of aggression.  Thus, deterrence in 
Europe is actually strengthened by the presence of the French atomic 
force.70 
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This controversial concept was seen by many as the only role that France could play 
within the nuclear strategy of the Alliance.  According to Raymond Aaron, surely one of 
the keenest thinkers about policy and nuclear war in post-war France, “the threat, though 
not explicit, of using the French atomic force as a detonator is its sole conceivable 
deterrent function within the framework of the present Atlantic organization.”71  This 
sentiment was held primarily by American strategists who saw this as a more realistic 
relationship compared to the unclear concept of “multilateral deterrence.”  The American 
strategist Stanley Hoffman supported this notion, as he understood it, with his assessment 
that “the mere presence of an independent French nuclear threat would be a sort of 
‘preventive trigger’ that would prevent the nuclear trigger from ever having to be 
pulled.”72  However, according to Gordon, “Beaufre himself always avoided the explicit 
argument that the French nuclear force could act as a ‘trigger’ for the American one, but 
the notion was implicit in his analysis.  Indeed, it was difficult to imagine the mechanism 
by which multilateral deterrence would work if not via the nuclear trigger.73 
  The drawback for the nuclear trigger option was the disastrous 
consequences that Europe would endure if deterrence failed.  Although never an official 
French strategy it did have resonance in the Fifth Republic.  The political, rather than 
military utility of the concept was pointed out by Gordon when he stated it was “an early 
form of ‘coupling,’ the tying together of American interests with European ones.  Its 
goal, like that of deterrence in general, lay ‘not in the actual employment of nuclear 
weapons but simply in the utilization of their threat.’  Thus, the French force need not—
indeed, must not—actually be a detonator for an American strategic launch but had only 
to remind the Russians in advance of the possibility of American support for France.”74  
Although not necessarily advocated by Beaufre in his theory, the “nuclear trigger” 
provided the mechanism by which France increased uncertainty for the Soviet Union thus 
complicating the strategic calculations and multiplying the risk of attack or invasion. 
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3.  Gaullist Strategic Thought 
 As president of the newly formed Fifth Republic and the man most responsible 
for the force de frappe, de Gaulle was more of a grand strategist than a figure on the cusp 
of strategy at the operational level of war.  De Gaulle supported the development of the 
French nuclear arsenal in order to increase national independence rather than for 
operational purposes in a narrow sense alone.  As indicated in earlier assessments, 
nuclear weapons became the central instrument of de Gaulle’s foreign policy and the 
means to regain grandeur.  Ultimately responsible for French strategy, de Gaulle’s 
political objectives were much more important than the intricacies and nuances of nuclear 
doctrine and the formulation of theory, and his reliance on the theories of early French 
strategist such a Gallois and Beaufre seemed to be limited, although elements of their 
theories were prominent in the overall strategy.    As Freedman points out, “He does not 
appear to have been influenced by his country’s strategic theorists.”75  Wilfrid Kohl 
corroborates this assessment when he said, “de Gaulle himself has emphasized the broad 
political purposes of his atomic force and has, for the most part, left the strategic 
arguments and the development of a strategic doctrine to his military officers.  In the 
mind of the general the political purposes of the force de dissuasion appear 
paramount.”76  However true this may be, ultimately de Gaulle did produce a strategy 
that was driven more by circumstance rather than lofty theory.   
a. Driven by Circumstances: The “Anti-Cities” Strategy 
At the beginning of the nuclear program and the height of the Cold War, 
de Gaulle was limited by the technological deficiencies of a new nuclear program and a 
relatively small conventional force. As Gordon points out: 
Without serious conventional forces, any sort of flexible response, or even 
meaningful ‘pause’ or ‘firebreak,’ was excluded.  Without the second 
strike capability afforded by invulnerable nuclear submarines or highly 
dispersed missiles, any counterforce alternatives to the threatening of 
Soviet cities were inconceivable.  With no tactical nuclear weapons, even 
a ‘warning shot’ to announce an impending strategic response was not in 
the range of options for the French.  Under these conditions, only a ‘pure’ 
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strategic deterrent, based on the threat of a massive nuclear strike against 
the Soviet population, was logically possible for France.”77  
Embedded in this analysis is the foundation for de Gaulle’s strategy.  Given the limited 
resources, the only valid target would be population centers.  De Gaulle did not argue for 
counterforce targets or warning shots.  For de Gaulle, “the ‘anti-cities strategy’ was the 
only one that could be truly deterrent.”78 However, contrary to Freedman and Kohl’s 
assessment of de Gaulle’s theoretical influence by Gallois and Beaufre, it is undeniable 
that some of the concepts developed by these theorists did influence de Gaulle and are 
evident in official statements defining French strategy, the most obvious of these being 
that of Gallois’s “proportional deterrence” and to a lesser extent Beaufre’s “multilateral 
deterrence” and the concept of a “nuclear trigger.”  In any case, it must be noted that 
there is no single government source or documentation for French strategic doctrine; it 
therefore must be extrapolated from official statements of the President or his 
government officials.  In a July 1964 press conference, de Gaulle’s acceptance of 
proportional deterrence was illustrated in his comment: 
We are in a position to think that five years from now our deterrent means 
will reach a total instantaneous power of 2,000 Hiroshima bombs…The 
field of deterrence is thus henceforth open to us.  For to attack France 
would be equivalent, for whomever it might be, to undergoing frightful 
destruction itself.  Doubtless the megatons that we could launch would not 
equal in number those that Americans and Russians are able to unleash.  
But, once reaching a certain nuclear capability, and with regard to one’s 
own direct defense, the proportion of respective means has no absolute 
value.  Indeed, since a man and a people can only die once, the deterrent 
exists provided that one has the means to wound the possible aggressor 
mortally, that one is very determined to do it and that the aggressor is 
convinced of it.79 
 
De Gaulle accepted Gallois’ “fragment of truth” that a minimal nuclear threat was 
capable of deterring a greater power and focused this concept toward population centers 
which were the most vulnerable and lucrative targets. 
 
                                                 
77 Gordon, “Idea of France,” 57. 
78 Freedman, “Evolution of Strategy,” 309. 
79 Kohl, “French Nuclear Diplomacy,” 152. 
34 
b. The Gaullist “Initial Safeguard” 
As the nuclear program progressed and the political realities of the 
alliance further marginalized France, de Gaulle continued to try and adjust his position 
within NATO.  It is here that de Gaulle incorporated the concepts of Beaufre into the 
rhetoric of nuclear diplomacy for which de Gaulle was so keen.  Although Beaufre’s 
theory of “multilateral deterrence”  and “nuclear trigger” were never officially sanctioned 
elements of French strategy, nonetheless reference to this idea did make its way into the 
French strategic mindset, as noted by Kohl, when, “in a speech in 1964 at Strasbourg, de 
Gaulle spoke of the desirability of establishing a European defense system in order to 
assure ‘the initial safeguard of the Old Continent,’ implying that the United States would 
have to come to the rescue in case of a major conflict.”80  This would imply that some 
sort of alliance and strategic planning would need to exist in order to ensure this outcome.  
But for de Gaulle, the idea of France’s weapons as a “trigger” decreased its legitimacy as 
a deterrent and it would be difficult for de Gaulle to portray France as an independent 
force if there was a relationship in which France was dependent on NATO or the United 
States.  But, as Gordon points out: 
De Gaulle never rejected the notion of alliances, and because he always 
counted on the insurance of the American protectorate, he can probably be 
assumed to have counted in part on the “trigger” effect.  The general may 
have refused Beaufre’s contention that successful multilateral deterrence 
required a closely linked alliance, and he never liked to admit the 
dependence of French deterrence on the Untied States.  But if the Soviets 
believed the French nuclear force might act as a trigger, then de Gaulle 
was happy to accept whatever strategic leverage this might imply for 
France.81   
 
Above all, de Gaulle’s desire was to preserve France and avoid a catastrophe similar to 
World War II.  Regardless of desire, de Gaulle knew that American force added to the 
security of France, but as the Cold War progressed and the United States repeatedly 
fought wars in Asia or otherwise pursued its national interest at what might have seemed 
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to the expense of the central commitment to the defense of continental Europe, this 
security became a liability that might drag France into a conflict which it did not want.82 
c. Defense for Every Point of the Compass 
Another element of strategy established by de Gaulle which became 
apparent in the mid 1960’s and which was unique to France was the famous doctrine of 
“defense tous azimuts” (overall defense/defense of all azimuths).  The rationale behind 
the theory rested on the faith in nuclear weapons and the belief that the uncertainty of the 
international environment would require France to be able to deter aggressors around the 
globe with “megaton ballistic missiles of a world-wide range.”83 This element was never 
fully implemented due to the lack of long-range nuclear capability but it did become a 
part of official French doctrine, albeit briefly, and was consistent with de Gaulle’s goal of 
independence.  This strategy was articulated by General Charles Ailleret in an article 
published in the Revue de Défense Nationale in which he argued that it was “no longer 
possible to plan for war against ‘a single, well-defined, possible enemy’ because the 
future was so uncertain.”84  The rationale for this strategy stemmed from the events of the 
mid-1960s and was influenced by de Gaulle’s own doubts about the stability provided by 
the competing superpowers and how long it would last.  As Freedman points out, “the 
Soviet threat had diminished while the Americans were becoming more threatening, by 
getting themselves into dangerous adventures in Vietnam.”85  Not wanting to be dragged 
into a conflict in which France did not condone and fearing escalation of American 
adventures, de Gaulle wanted France to further separate itself from the prevailing trends.  
De Gaulle voiced these concerns in 1959 when he noted, “Probably the sort of 
equilibrium that is establishing itself between the atomic powers of two camps is, for the 
moment, a factor in world peace, but who can say what will happen tomorrow.”86  An 
effort to prepare for the potential threat from different enemies and further establish a 
                                                 
82 This syndrome has operated in the post-1989 world as well, with the most recent evidence being the 
2003 invasion of Iraq led by the United States and supported by a “coalition of the willing.” 
83 Freedman, “Evolution of Strategy,” 307. 
84 Quoted in Freedman, “Evolution of Strategy,” 306. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Quoted in Ibid. 
36 
capability and strategy independent from NATO led to the development of the strategy of 
defense tous azimuts, which, in theory, would allow France to further distance herself 
from the alliance and maintain autonomy in her foreign policy.  This concept also 
allowed for a rapprochement and détente with Eastern Europe and gave legitimacy to de 
Gaulle’s call for further development and expansion of the force de frappe, including 
thermonuclear tipped ICBM’s. 
C.  THE LEGACY OF DE GAULLE: FRENCH STRATGEY THROUGHOUT 
THE COLD WAR 
More than any other individual, de Gaulle shaped the foundations of French 
nuclear armament based on national independence and autonomy.  He strove to 
reestablish France’s grandeur within the international system and created a “Gaullist 
doctrine” that would influence and guide the French Republic for the remainder of the 
Cold War.  He had advanced the idea of an autonomous French nuclear arsenal and 
sought to move from an “Atlantic” to a “European” security role.  During this time he 
had criticized NATO and the United States, ultimately leading to France’s withdrawal 
from NATO military integration.  He was able to negotiate French independence with 
relative strength bolstered by the progress of the French nuclear program, the American 
quagmire in Vietnam, a strong French economy, and the emerging détente in Europe. 
However, events in the last twelve months of his Presidency decreased de Gaulle’s 
assertion for French independence.  During this time the labor strikes of May 1968 and 
subsequent wage concessions shook French society and de Gaulle’s power.87  
Additionally, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968 had 
convinced de Gaulle that the Cold War had not ended and it presented a serious risk to 
Europe.  These events led to a shift in French diplomacy that signaled a rapprochement 
toward NATO and a move away from the radical positions of the early 1960s.  This shift 
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in strategy would influence France’s doctrine for the remainder of the Cold War but 
allow France to remain relatively independent. 88 
1. Rapprochement with NATO: The Fourquet Doctrine 
Just one month before de Gaulle’s resignation, in March 1969, General Michel 
Fourquet, chief of staff of the armed forces, gave a speech at the Institut des Hautes 
Etudes de Défense Nationale.  In this speech the general established the foundation for 
the future of French nuclear forces indicating the acceptance of a policy of a graduated or 
flexible response similar to that of NATO, rather than the earlier all-out, massive 
retaliation.89  This new policy, which was the result of a major policy review in the 
autumn of 1969, led to the development of what was termed the Fourquet Doctrine.  
According to Philip Gordon, “the speech is noteworthy not only because Fourquet was 
making the final major defense policy statement approved by de Gaulle but because it 
was the first attempt to express French strategy as the major elements of the nuclear force 
came onto line.  It was also important because it was the first of several highly consistent 
policy formulations that would emerge during the Pompidou administration, formulations 
that set a standard for subsequent continuity and change.”90  Compared to General 
Ailleret’s previous statements, this shift in doctrine marked a departure from the extremes 
of French isolation supported by de Gaulle earlier in his administration. 
The Fourquet Doctrine refocused French strategic doctrine from a world wide 
perspective, back to the Soviet threat and supported a more flexible and adaptable nuclear 
strategy, commensurate with but not exactly like NATO’s thinking on deterrence.  
Menon highlights the major elements of this shift when he surmises, “Fourquet 
questioned the concept of a deterrent strategy based wholly on massive retaliation against 
an unidentified foe, and stressed both the likelihood of an enemy coming from the east, 
and the need for a strategy allowing both for gradual escalation and the possibility of 
participation in forward defense.”91  This assessment seems to formalize the conclusions 
that de Gaulle had himself reached at the end of his career, primarily that “pure 
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deterrence” based on nuclear power alone was not flexible enough to tackle the threat 
posed by the Soviet Union.  The “all or nothing” posture of massive retaliation supported 
by the rhetoric of the early 1960’s left little room for maneuver and became less credible 
and realistic over time.  This new doctrine opened the door for coordination between 
French and NATO conventional forces and its implementation was dependent on the use 
of tactical nuclear weapons which were supposed to be ready by 1972.  However, this 
shift in policy did not imply that France would rejoin the integrated military structure 
only that it saw the value in coordinating a strategy that would allow gradual escalation 
aimed at the primary goal of defending French national interests with its nuclear arsenal.  
Seen as the last strategic vision by de Gaulle, the Fourquet doctrine in no way meant that 
France had put away its stress on independence and autonomy and as Menon points out, 
“French policy after the resignation of de Gaulle continued to display ambivalence 
concerning solidarity with allies, ambivalence incorporated into a doctrine fossilized 
through official publication in the White Paper of 1972.”92 
2. Pompidou:  Continuation of Gaullist Strategy  
Even after de Gaulle’s resignation in April 1969, the force of his doctrines and the 
force de frappe continued to strongly influence French identity and policy.  During his 
immediate successor’s administration, Georges Pompidou continued to maintain the 
legacy of de Gaulle from 1969 to 1974.  As Gordon points out:  
The emphasis on continuity in defense policy was clear not only in the 
rhetoric and symbols of independence and greatness but in terms of 
military programs and procurement, budgets, and the composition  of 
forces….The emphasis on continuity and the irreversibility of Gaullist 
priorities was written clearly into the military program law of 1970 (for 
1971-1975), which began with the classic statement that ‘the major 
objective of [our] national defense is maintaining the independence of our 
country in liberty and peace.93   
 
For all practical purposes the vision of de Gaulle remained alive and well in the French 
Republic.  The significance of this vision could be seen in the growing support for and 
development of French nuclear assets.  During Pompidou’s term:  
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The French nuclear force had expanded and was greatly improved, notably 
with the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, intermediate-range 
missiles on the Plateau d’ Albion and strategic submarines as mentioned; 
superpower détente had become practically institutionalized, with strategic 
arms control stabilized to a point of dangerously resembling the 
‘condominium’ feared by de Gaulle; and despite arms control, the Soviet 
Union had gone from a clearly inferior strategic position vis-à-vis the 
United States to numerical superiority in  both ICBM’s and strategic 
submarine launchers.94  
 
These strategic changes created a broad array of questions concerning the utility and 
strategy of French nuclear forces and signified the beginning of an evolution in French 
strategic doctrine that would be solidified in a 1972 defense White Paper.  
a. The 1972 White Paper on National Defense 
The Livre Blanc Sur La Défense Nationale (National Defense White 
Paper) can be seen as the single most powerful affirmation of de Gaulle’s legacy of 
defense doctrine.  It established what the French “national interests” were and clarified 
the role in which nuclear arms would be used to secure them.  The doctrine established 
by the paper advocated all of the principle Gaullist thoughts into a cohesive assessment of 
French defense.   As Gordon points out, “the White Paper, unprecedented in the Fifth 
Republic, was a comprehensive statement of the objectives, means, missions, and 
organization of French forces and, although it did not appear until two years after the 
General’s death, stands as probably the best single official expression of Gaullist 
principles of national defense.”95  It upheld three primary concepts espoused by de 
Gaulle in which, “proportional deterrence was the primary means by which France 
ensured its own defense and avoided war; the American guarantee was not automatic and 
the ‘nuclear risk’ could not be shared.”96  Additionally, the authors of the White Paper 
supported the flexibility proposed in the Fourquet doctrine and rejected the idea of a 
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global nuclear defense or an “all-or-nothing” deterrence, theorized by Gallois stating that 
it was inconceivable 
To think of retaliating to all hostile action, regardless of where it comes 
from by nuclear threat.  Therefore, it is necessary to be able to oppose 
limited hostile actions either by counteracting directly or by reverting to 
appropriate retaliation.  The notion of deterrence is not absent from this 
point of view, but when the atomic weapon, because of its very excess, 
cannot constitute a credible deterrent, conventional and easily deployed 
means should be available.  Crossing the threshold of the atomic threat can 
only be justified in a really critical situation.97   
The relevance of the White Paper’s assertions lies in the institutionalization of de 
Gaulle’s strategic thinking and the legacy which would be maintained throughout the 
remainder of the Cold War.  This legacy would continue to provide the guiding principles 
which France would rely on to support and modernize its atomic forces through the next 
four administrations. And as the nuances of strategy would be manipulated by those 
administrations, the theoretical foundations of Gaullist thought would continue to prevail. 
b.   Increasing Flexibility: Tactical Nuclear Weapons 
The more flexible path for deterrence laid out by the 1972 White Paper 
contributed to the acquisition of additional means to indicate French resolve.  Though the 
most broadly held conceptions of French nuclear forces were considered strategic, in the 
mid-1970’s a “tactical” element of French nuclear forces emerged, “as a means of 
demonstrating a seriousness of purpose, perhaps to useful military effect, but without 
triggering the holocaust.”98  The intent of this concept would be to signify to an 
adversary (primarily the Soviet Union) the resolve and determination to protect France’s 
vital interests which would hopefully lead to a political solution rather than an escalation 
of conventional aggression into nuclear exchanges.  This new gradual response option  
was consistent with the objectives and capabilities of the French nuclear deterrent force 
which were poised against a significant major power that had the ability to conquer 
France with its conventional power alone.  As one analyst pointed out, “The Cold War 
doctrine talked of deterrence ‘du faible au fort’, from the weak to the strong.  This 
consisted essentially of being able to inflict enough damage on any potential aggressor--
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for all practical purposes the Soviet Union--to mean that an attack on France would not 
be worthwhile.”99   Although these weapons indicated a shift from strategic to tactical 
uses, it did not represent a fundamental change in strategy; rather, it emphasized the 
deterrence of war and the long-held French doctrine of “non-war.”  These basic tenets of 
non-war, highlighted in the White Paper, were expressed by de Gaulle himself through 
three basic principles: “(1) American nuclear protection was no longer perfectly effective 
in the ballistic missile age; and (2) a war fought in Europe along the lines of NATO’s 
plans for flexible response, even if ‘won,’ would be an unambiguous disaster for Europe.  
(3) The obvious strategic goal of France, under these conditions, was to prevent a war 
from occurring, not by posturing to win it but by making it too risky for the potential 
aggressor to start.”100  Since de Gaulle’s era, the French have maintained a policy of non-
emploi (non-use), the central theme being that nuclear arms provided the political means 
by which to avoid war altogether rather than the military means to enact war.  As Robbin 
Laird points out, “the French present their doctrine as a strategy of ‘non-war,’ as opposed 
to NATO strategy, which ‘explicitly envisages the possibility of a conflict.’ French 
doctrine only envisages that possibility to the extent necessary to test the enemy’s 
intentions prior to first nuclear strike.  Deterrence consequently equated with the 
impossibility of war.”101  Therefore, the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons and the 
doctrine of non-emploi can be seen as extensions of Gaullist thought and strategy that 
were clarified by the strategic review in the 1972 White Paper and upheld in the 
Presidency of Georges Pompidou.  Tactical nuclear weapons continued to be designated 
as strategic weapons aimed at dissuasion of a Soviet attack.  As Laird indicates, 
“according to the French, their tactical nuclear weapons are not to be considered as battle 
field weapons, whereas U.S. weapons are positioned to fight a limited nuclear war that 
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might well engulf France.”102 The strategy embodies by the White Paper and the 
development of tactical nuclear weapons created an “ambiguous” doctrine of deterrence 
that left open the exact role and function of the French nuclear force, particularly in 
relation to the defense of Europe.   The strategic vision upheld in the Pompidou era and 
supported by the White Paper would have a lasting effect on subsequent administrations 
and would continue to be the guiding light for nuclear strategy until the end of the Cold 
War. 
3.  Continuities with Change: Giscard d’Estaing and Mitterrand 
With the foundations of French nuclear diplomacy and strategy established by de 
Gaulle and later the 1972 White Paper under Pompidou, the mid 1970’s saw the advent of 
an effort to shift away from Gaullist thinking and expand not only the nuclear strategy 
but also diplomatic efforts within the alliance.  During the 1960’s, under de Gaulle, 
nuclear ambitions drove strategy and diplomacy within the French Republic.  “Under 
Giscard d’Estaing, an attempt was made fundamentally to alter the content of French 
deterrent strategy.”103  This shift sought to broaden French nuclear strategy through the 
expansion of tactical nuclear weapons and an enlarged “anti-cities” strategy bordering on 
counter-force targeting and by increasing support for conventional forces necessary to 
ensure European security.  The pillars of Giscard’s vision lay in the premises of 
European, Atlantic, and non-nuclear variables contrary to Gaullist thought.  As Gordon 
points out:  
The European premise was that France, no matter how secure in might be 
able to protect its national territory with the force de frappe, could never 
count on remaining free if the rest of Western Europe did not also remain 
free…The Atlantic premise was that in order to prevent such a somber 
situation, the Atlantic Alliance, not a putative European Alliance, had to 
remain the primary forum for French defense, and… the non-nuclear 
premise was that a defense posture excessively reliant on nuclear 
deterrence was not credible, and thus only a more flexible strategy 
including increased conventional options could contribute adequately to 
French security.104  
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Moving forward under these precepts Giscard initiated revisions in the nuclear 
strategy with the intent of improving Frances responsive capabilities.  It is important to 
note that although conventional forces will not be discussed in this account, the shift in 
emphasis from nuclear to conventional capabilities indicates a fundamental change of 
course compared to previous administration.105  The reduced emphasis on conventional 
capabilities and their role in the alliance became a focal point for newly elected President 
Valery Giscard d’Estaing.   Although initially successful, Giscard’s policies would 
eventually be restrained and returned to Gaullist principles by the end of his tenure and 
subsequently under the Mitterrand administration.  
a. Giscard’s Adaptation of Nuclear Strategy 
The principles of Gaullist thought and the strategic vision established by 
the 1972 White Paper came under fire in the seven-year presidency of Giscard d’Estaing 
(1974-1981).   Giscard sought to clarify the ambiguity of the 1972 White Paper and 
improve alliance discourse by restoring elements of alliance solidarity in French defense 
discourse.  Giscard considered France a key player in the alliance and that France’s 
nuclear weapons could serve the alliance indirectly while simultaneously serving French 
interests directly.  Additionally, Giscard questioned the all-or-nothing counter value 
nuclear strategy of massive retaliation and supported a more flexible and broader array of 
nuclear capability that could bring together alliance interests, and suggested a battlefield 
role for tactical nuclear weapons.106  Under his European premise, “the Giscard d’Estaing 
administration expanded the scope of potential interest served by French military 
power—including by implication the nuclear forces—by introducing a concept of an 
‘enlarged sanctuary’.” 107   General Guy Mery, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, 
introduced the concept of extended sanctuarization (enlarged sanctuary), as the ability to 
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“allow us to intervene with the whole or part of our forces throughout the entire zone 
where the security of this country may be immediately threatened.”108   
This signaled an expansion of nuclear doctrine that might include areas 
outside of French borders when national territory had not yet been attacked but was 
potentially threatened.  Under Giscard, “the tactical nuclear strike would neither be an 
abstract nuclear warning shot nor part of proportional deterrence but a militarily useful 
gesture that would force an aggressor to disperse its forces, to prepare them for a nuclear 
environment, and ultimately, to stop in the face of nuclear fire.”109  However, by the end 
of the 1970’s this concept was rejected by French officials and as David Yost observed, 
“the French added the term non-bataille (non-battle) to their strategic lexicon, a corollary 
of the term non-emploi (non-use).  As on the strategic nuclear level, France’s means were 
too limited to contemplate combat with tactical nuclear arms.”110  Tactical nuclear 
weapons morphed into the concept of “pre-strategic” weapons that would be used as an 
arme d’ ultime avertissement (weapons of final warning).  This basic foundation, 
established under the concept of the “warning shot” during the de Gaulle and Pompidou 
periods, remained unchanged for the remainder of the Cold War.   
b. Enlarged “Anti-Cities” Strategy 
Along these same lines, Giscard attempted to shift the targeting of French 
strategic nuclear forces toward an “enlarged anti-cities strategy.”  This was an attempt to 
broaden the concept of the “anti-cities” strategy by targeting industrial, economic and 
military targets bordering on a counter-force strategy.  David Yost states that Giscard had 
authorized the expansion of the “anti-cities” strategy when he reported in his memoirs 
that he had approved “as the objective for our strategic strike ‘the destruction of 40% of 
the economic capabilities of the Soviet Union on this side of the Urals, and the 
disorganization of the country’s leadership apparatus.’”111  However, like the tactical 
nuclear strategy, this concept had little usefulness and was short-lived due to the lack of 
means and accuracy for a counter-force strategy.  The expanded strategy also posed a 
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much greater problem explained General Mery: “even if we had sufficiently accurate 
weapons, we would destroy only a truly minor part of his entire order of battle, and we 
would then be assured of his immediate retaliation.”112  Given France’s limited nuclear 
resources anything other than a massive retaliation against Soviet cities that would 
produce unacceptable damages would limit the effectiveness of deterrence.   
By the end of Giscard’s tenure, despite a successful beginning, each of 
these initiates had been challenged.  The prevailing political power of Gaullists, 
economic constraints, and military shortfalls decreased Giscard’s ability to make any 
permanent changes to the strategy of the force de frappe and ultimately led to the return 
of a nuclear deterrent strategy based on the perspectives of de Gaulle and the 1972 White 
Paper.  And, as Gordon points out, “when looked at closely, however, Giscard did sustain 
the priority accorded to nuclear deterrence, and if no new nuclear programs were 
initiated, the modernization and improvement of old ones did go ahead…Despite some 
changes in particular military doctrine, French security policy during the Giscard years 
remained Gaullist.  Giscard maintained the priority of autonomy of decision, and 
continued to pursue the objectives of French primacy and national grandeur.”113 
4.   Mitterrand’s Nuclear Strategy 
After Giscard’s presidency, the incoming President François Mitterrand (1981-
1995) would be the first Socialist government in the Fifth Republic.  The Socialists, and 
in particular Mitterrand, had been the most ardent voice of opposition to Gaullist defense 
policies since the 1960s.  Gaullist elites feared that this new Socialist government would 
make fundamental changes to defense policy, particularly the force de frappe, which 
would negate the fundamental principles of autonomy and independence established by 
de Gaulle.  However, these fears never materialized, and under Mitterrand, Gaullist 
defense principles and nuclear strategy were upheld.  As Philip Gordon noted, “President 
Francois Mitterrand had for decades been General de Gaulle’s most severe and most 
persistent critic, yet by 1981 he was implementing a security policy that was firmly in the 
Gaullist tradition.”114  The most prominent reasons for upholding Gaullist principles 
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were that by the mid-1970s the logic and basic principle of de Gaulle’s strategic policies 
had become embedded in the French political and military ethos and domestically the 
sense of independence and doctrine established by de Gaulle had become a political “vote 
getter” which the Socialist need to remain in power.115  This assessment most certainly 
pertains to French nuclear strategy as well, in that changes initiated by Giscard would be 
overturned and clarified in such a fashion as to be clearly Gaullist in principle and 
practice.   
The influence of Gaullist thought became most evident in the nuclear policy of 
Mitterrand, “because of the priority accorded to it, the force structure adopted for it, and 
the employment doctrine with which it was governed.”116  The return to Gaullist 
principles can best be demonstrated with two issues Mitterrand supported in the nuclear 
doctrine.  First, Mitterrand sought to reestablish the nuclear force in its national nature, as 
Gordon indicates in the following assessment: 
The continued influence of Gaullist traditions was also apparent in the 
doctrines that governed the nuclear force.  In contrast to Giscard’s early 
experiments with an implicit extension of the French deterrent, the 
Mitterrand administration began much more cautiously.  To be sure, the 
socialists continued to emphasis the principles of “uncertainty” and “vital 
interest” that had become part of the French strategic landscape since the 
early 1970’s.  They recognized as well as anyone that a gap existed 
between the concept of a national nuclear sanctuary and the expression of 
solidarity in Europe, and that the gap was growing as the American 
nuclear guarantee became less and less credible.  But at the same time, the 
Mitterrand team insisted, publicly at least, that the “rules” governing 
France’s nuclear force had not fundamentally changed.117 
In essence, Mitterrand changed course from the previous administrations attempt to 
expand the role of the French nuclear arsenal toward Europe, by reasserting that France’s 
nuclear assets would be strictly for national interests and that these weapons were could 
not be shared.  These sentiments returned French strategy back to the principles 
established in the 1972 White Paper, which were the most supported official statement of 
Gaullist principles.  Additionally, Mitterrand took issue with the deployment doctrine for 
tactical nuclear weapons that Giscard had attempted to expand. 
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 The 1972 White Paper had supported de Gaulle’s notion of tactical nuclear 
weapons should be considered strategic in nature and used as a “warning shot” to indicate 
French resolve.  This strategic principle had been changed in the Giscard administration 
toward a battlefield use which could augment conventional forces and European allies.  
As Gordon points out, Mitterrand reoriented the use of tactical nuclear weapons back to 
Gaullist principles: 
The influence of Gaullist doctrines on Socialist military policy—once 
again to a greater degree than under the previous administration—was also 
apparent in tactical nuclear doctrine.  Whereas Giscard had announced that 
tactical nuclear weapons were ‘battlefield weapons as well as weapons of 
deterrence,’ Mitterrand made it explicit that they would not be used ‘like 
some sort of battlefield super-artillery.”  One year later, the administration 
defined its position on tactical nuclear arms even more clearly by 
changing their official name to armes pré-stratégiques  (pre-strategic 
weapons) thus emphasizing their direct link to the strategic nuclear force.  
This ‘new’ concept was, in fact, a return to the ‘old’ one as written into the 
White Paper in 1972.  France’s short-range nuclear weapons would be 
given no battlefield role whatsoever, and their sole purpose was to signal 
to a potential adversary France’s willingness to use its nuclear arms.118 
Thus, a full return to the ideals and principles of de Gaulle was orchestrated by an 
administration that had initially been seen as the antithesis of Gaullist thought.  
Mitterrand, the most unlikely of subjects to do so, had effectively taken on the doctrines 
and principle of de Gaulle as his own, which further increased the legacy of Gaullist 
strategy in French defense policy.  Aside from these two issues, Mitterrand did seek to 
improve relations with the alliance and West Germany along the lines of Giscard but not 
to the detriment of Gaullist thought.  In the final analysis, “the adaptation of François 
Mitterrand to the habits, doctrines, theories, and force postures put in place by General de 
Gaulle was, thus, remarkable, and it could scarcely be argued that the early 1980’s saw a 
fundamental break with traditional Gaullist practices and principles where national 
defense was concerned.”119  
D. CONCLUSION 
The inception of the force de frappe during the Fourth Republic and later its 
official sanctioning and implementation under President de Gaulle in 1958 was a 
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concerted effort to obtain the weaponry which would allow France to strengthen its 
defensive autonomy in the nuclear age.  This desire for independence was driven by the 
search for grandeur in international politics which had become an influential driving 
force within French society and politics since the enlightenment.  The most ardent 
proponent for the search for grandeur, General de Gaulle, sought to obtain nuclear 
weapons in order to counteract the influence and hegemony of the United States and 
improve France’s political standing vis-à-vis the Atlantic Alliance which had been 
marginalized after World War II.  For de Gaulle, an independent French nuclear arsenal 
represented the most powerful political tool obtainable to pursue this goal.   
With the first successful nuclear test in 1960, General de Gaulle formulated a 
nuclear doctrine which accentuated his political goal of independence while providing 
France with a nuclear arsenal designed to ensure the “vital interests” of France were 
protected against Anglo-Saxon dominance and Soviet aggression.  Based in some part on 
the theories of French strategists General Gallois and Beaufre, a nuclear deterrent 
strategy of “proportional deterrence” was established that would allow for the deterrence 
of the strong by the weak.  As Alliance stability and the nuclear umbrella fell into 
question, the advent of the independent nuclear force paved the way for France’s 
withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure.  Gaullism became the mainstay of 
political and strategic thinking within France that would dominate French nuclear 
doctrine for the remainder of the Cold War. 
Gaullist strategy and diplomacy continued to guide the administrations of 
Pompidou, Giscard, and Mitterrand.  During the Pompidou period, France developed its 
defense doctrine and adopted and codified the principles of Gaullism in the 1972 Defense 
White Paper that identified the primary goals, missions, and doctrine for the French 
nuclear forces.  This event further codified Gaullist principles in French defense and laid 
the foundation for a nuclear strategy which would be questioned by the administration of 
President Giscard d’Estaing.  Giscard sought to expand French nuclear doctrine and the 
role of tactical nuclear weapons by moving it closer to the European and Alliance 
mainstream.  The widening of nuclear deterrence to an “enlarged sanctuary” and the 
battlefield use of tactical nuclear weapons reoriented the French nuclear doctrine away 
from strictly national focus and Gaullist principles.  However successful at first, these 
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policies ultimately came into question, and by the early 1980s were adjusted back to their 
Gaullist foundations in the Mitterrand Presidency.  During Mitterrand’s term in office, 
the Socialist administration surprisingly upheld virtually every Gaullist principle of 
nuclear deterrence policy.  Throughout these administrations de Gaulle’s strategy 
influenced and guided French policy and provided the necessary justification for the 
expansion of French nuclear forces and strategy for the remainder of the Cold War. 
Although Gaullist principles remained intact, the fall of the Berlin wall and the 
end of the Cold War in 1989-1991 ushered in the possibility for unprecedented 
democratization, peace and prosperity throughout Europe, creating euphoric optimism 
that “international institutions and norms could eventually prevent, contain, and resolve 
all manner of conflicts.”120  The experience of the Persian Gulf War stimulated the notion 
that the United Nations and European-Atlantic institutions such as NATO were no longer 
paralyzed as collective security organizations and the hopes were that Europe would 
finally escape its militaristic past.  All across Europe the Cold War mentality switched to 
an almost “pacifist” predilection toward conflict. The use of force was downplayed and 
the outbreak of war seemed to most observers of strategy to be unthinkable.  The prospect 
of peace coupled with economic development reduced the emphasis on military means 
for conflict resolution within Europe.  This attitude certainly did not escape France and 
the sea-change in the international environment created new uncertainty for the French 
nuclear strategy and the French arsenal.  However, this new “world order” brought about 
unexpected crises within and beyond Europe that would require a shift in strategic 
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III. EVOLUTION OF FRENCH STRATEGY BEYOND THE COLD 
WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION: THE SECOND COMING OF THE NUCLEAR AGE 
In the post-Cold War era, the threat environment throughout the world has 
continued to evolve, due in part to new challenges brought forth by globalization, 
technology, the threat of attacks by terrorists or “rogue” states, possibly with Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD).  This new threat environment has led to an evolution in 
French national security strategy including the nuclear deterrent policy.  France 
maintained a deterrent strategy based on Gaullist principles, but the changing 
international environment and “the end of the cold war saw France frozen in a deterrent 
position that had become obsolete.”121  Beginning with a Defense White Paper in 1994, 
Paris recognized the significant and dynamic strategic context and threats that began to 
emerge after the end of the Cold War, and in 1999 started a process of review and 
revision of its nuclear deterrent policy and forces.  This evolutionary process yielded a 
transformation in French nuclear doctrine and strategic forces which was initially 
highlighted in a speech by President Jacques Chirac on June 8, 2001, to the Institute of 
Higher National Defense Studies.  The speech indicated an initial shift in French nuclear 
strategy and future capabilities that continues to evolve through today. The events of 
September 11, 2001, the rise of extremist terrorism, “rogue” states with WMD 
capabilities and the threat of regional powers has provided ample stimulus for a revision 
in strategy that attempts to address these threats through new concepts in nuclear 
deterrence.  
1. A New “World Order”: The Second Nuclear Age 
That France has recognized a need to review and amend her deterrent strategy 
based on new threats such as terrorism, “rogue” states with WMD, and regional conflict 
is not sufficient to account for the deeper motivation guiding this new approach.  The 
broader issue pertains to the future of nuclear weapons and deterrent thought in the 
international system.  Although it is important for nuclear strategies to address current 
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threats, it is also important for them to adapt to changing world orders.  The end of the 
Cold War yielded a fundamental change in the landscape of international politics and 
security which prompted the widely held belief, or hope, that the collapse of the bi-polar 
world order would result in diminishing nuclear stockpiles and potentially the abolition of 
nuclear weapons all together.  As Avery Goldstein points out: 
As the Cold War ended, many hailed the advent of a “new world order.” 
Hopefully, it was asserted that the decades-long anxieties associated with 
superpower confrontation were ending. Many predicted that the post-Cold 
War world would be one in which old-style international politics was 
fundamentally transformed; economic issues would supplant military-
security concerns on the agenda of statesmen. In this context, nuclear 
weapons almost overnight seemed to lose their central role in international 
politics, though concerns about the challenge of managing nuclear risks on 
the periphery (the intertwined nightmares about proliferation, terrorists, 
and “rogue” states) continued. Indeed, the spreading conviction that the 
heyday of nuclear deterrence was over even led some of the leading 
figures from the weapons programs and strategic policy circles of the Cold 
War superpowers to recommend that the existing nuclear states dismantle 
what these new abolitionists now saw as pointless and morally dubious 
arsenals.122 
 
These hopes have helped sustain and strengthen a proliferation regime that includes the 
1969 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), reduction in nuclear forces amongst many 
nuclear powers after the Cold War, and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBN).  Although these efforts have been successful in many respects they have still 
not eliminated nuclear weapons in international politics nor completely stopped the 
proliferation of WMD.  Unfortunately, the reality was that the world had become much 
more unstable since the collapse of the Soviet Union and proliferation of nuclear 
weapons has and will continue to spawn.  Fred Charles Iklé thus talks about, “the second 
coming of the nuclear age.”123  The most recent examples of this can be seen in the 
nuclear ambitions of Iraq, Iran and North Korea.  Even with an international 
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nonproliferation movement to reduce nuclear weapons and downplay the importance of 
nuclear arsenals, nations are still seeking to obtain nuclear assets.  
2. Economics and Security in the Second Act of the Nuclear Age 
Although there are many causes for this “second nuclear age,” the economic and 
security reasoning stands out.  Both in economic and security terms, nuclear weapons 
provide states with limited resources and funding an attractive alternative to more costly 
conventional forms of protection and security as well as an opportunity to join in the 
political ranks of other nuclear nations.  Goldstein states, “for less prosperous countries 
facing daunting military threats and who are able to cross the nuclear threshold, the 
economic argument is even more compelling, since some will simply be unable to fund 
conventional forces in the quantity or quality that satisfies their security needs.”124  
Although expensive to develop and politically costly to acquire, nuclear weapons have a 
potential long-term beneficial payoff that far exceeds other alternatives.  Secondly, 
according to Goldstein: 
The shift from a bipolar to a unipolar and perhaps one day a multipolar 
world is unlikely to diminish, and may well increase, the appeal of the 
nuclear deterrent alternative. Under unipolarity, states unable to match the 
world’s sole surviving superpower and who believe it may threaten their 
interests, will see a nuclear deterrent as the most affordable and plausible 
counter within reach…Among several great powers, states may need to 
hedge against possibly shifting threat perceptions. Unlike conventional 
forces whose effectiveness is tailored to the nature of a particular 
adversary’s capabilities, the punitive effect of nuclear weapons is highly 
fungible and the payoff from investing in them is less volatile.”125   
 
Therefore, it is more than likely, regardless of nonproliferation regimes and 
counterproliferation efforts that nuclear weapons will continue to bridge the 
economic/security gap that exists in conventional programs making them a highly 
attractive option in the future. 
This assessment has broad implications for current nuclear powers and those that 
may try to acquire nuclear or WMD capabilities.  Certainly, the most troubling aspect of 
this situation is complicated by those “rogue states” or terrorist organizations which may 
attempt to capitalize on the proliferation of nuclear weapons for political gain, military 
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action, or ideological manifestations.  As for France, this threat has required a shift in 
nuclear strategy in an attempt to maintain the effectiveness of deterrence 
B. THE PROCESS OF CHANGE IN FRENCH STRATEGY SINCE THE 
COLD WAR 
Beginning with the Defense White Paper in 1994, which stated that, “…the cold 
war is over, but the nuclear era goes on,” Paris recognized the significant strategic 
context and dynamic threats that began to emerge after the end of the Cold War, and in 
1999 started a process of reviewing and revising its nuclear deterrent policy and 
forces.126  This process yielded a shift in French nuclear doctrine and strategic forces 
which was initially highlighted in the mentioned speech by President Jacques Chirac on 
June 8, 2001.    
1. Elements of Change: Chirac’s 2001 Speech on Nuclear Deterrence 
a. Nuclear Deterrence: Reaffirmation of Independence 
In order fully understand the significant issues promoted by President 
Chirac in his 2006 speech, it is necessary to incorporate some elements of the strategy 
that were highlighted in 2001.  In his June 8, 2001 speech, President Chirac outlined 
many of the basic elements of French strategy which were born in the Cold War and 
evolved during the revision process in the mid 1990s.  Many of the primary elements in 
French nuclear strategy remained unchanged throughout the review process initiated in 
1999 and continue to be the foundation for French policy.  First and foremost, Chirac 
reaffirmed the importance of the nuclear program and its value to the French republic 
when he stated, “Nuclear deterrence is the key element among the capabilities which 
enable France to affirm the principle of strategic autonomy which is fundamental to our 
defense policy.”127  Compared to many western powers that base much of their national 
security strategy on conventional might, France views its nuclear capability as the 
backbone of her political and military strength.  Secondly, Chirac maintained the most 
important objective of France’s nuclear forces as deterring major power threats by his 
asserting that “France’s survival will never be threatened by a major military power with 
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hostile intentions and prepared to use all possible capabilities to carry them out.”128  
Furthermore, he defined two additional goals fundamental to the deterrent strategy; to 
preserve France from exposure to blackmail by smaller powers armed with weapons of 
mass destruction; and to contribute to the security of Europe and the Atlantic alliance.  
He also reiterated the deterrent rationale of France’s nuclear posture when he stated, “our 
nuclear forces are not directed against any country and we have always rejected the idea 
of regarding nuclear weapons as combat weapons to be used as part of a military 
strategy.”129  Continuing France’s rejection of tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use 
and reinforcing the idea that if nuclear weapons were to be employed by France, it would 
indicate a fundamental change in the nature of the conflict.  Each of these aspects of the 
strategy had been a continuation of policy from both the Cold War experience and the 
events of the early 90’s which facilitated the revision process. 
b. Flexible Deterrence against “Rogue States” 
One of the innovations announced by Chirac in 2001 centered on the 
emergence of regional powers or “rogue states” that may threaten France’s vital interests 
with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.  Chirac stated: “Deterrence must also 
enable us to face up to the threats that regional powers possessing weapons of mass 
destruction might pose to our vital interests.”130  Due to the end of the Cold War and the 
further proliferation of WMD, France has had a particular concern with deterring regional 
powers that may threaten the homeland.  Chirac indicated a major shift in strategy when 
he said France’s nuclear arsenal would target “in priority it’s political, economic, and 
military centers of power.”131  This statement signals an adjustment which moves French 
strategy closer to NATO’s flexible response.”  Flexible response was adopted by 
NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in 1976 and was originally, as described earlier, 
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rejected by France.132 This shows a shift in thinking propagated by the nuclear revisions 
of the 1990s away from the all or nothing “anti-cities” deterrent strategy that was 
prominent during the Cold War toward a middle ground.  Unlike the “flexible response” 
option supported by NATO which incorporated flexibility in the event of nuclear 
confrontation; the French view this capability as a means for signaling an ultime 
avertissement (final warning).  Chirac signaled this concept in his 2001 speech when he 
said, “…the capability to signal, when the time comes, to a potential adversary, both that 
our vital interests are at stake and that we are determined to safeguard them.”133  Bruno 
Tertrais, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientist, points out that not only has France discarded 
the “anti-cities” strategy, but also “It is no longer possible to refer to France’s posture as 
a ‘deterrent of the strong by the weak’—now deterrence is judged valid when dealing 
with regional powers.”134   
The shift in strategy toward a more flexible response also implies that 
France will continue to move forward in the modernization of its nuclear forces.  Chirac 
stated: 
Against this background, and in agreement with the Prime Minister, I have 
defined a program for our nuclear forces which guarantees that France will 
possess a sufficiently diversified capability to ensure the credibility of our 
deterrent under any circumstances, wherever the threat originates and 
whatever its nature.  Our nuclear capability relies on two types of nuclear 
weapons with different and complementary technical characteristics: 
submarine-borne ballistic missiles equipping the ocean component, and 
air-breathing missiles for the airborne component.  The renewal and 
modernization of these forces, as well as the advancement of the 
simulation program, intended to compensate for the abandonment of 
nuclear tests designed to maintain our capabilities, constitute the next 
Military Program Act's key objectives in this area.  The volume and 
characteristics of these assets have been determined according to a 
criterion of strict sufficiency in the light of the political and strategic 
context. In applying this principle, France has always sought to define the 
lowest possible capability level compatible with her security.  Restricted 
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to strict sufficiency, our nuclear deterrent is, again, more than ever at the 
heart of our country's security.135 
 
Although France’s current nuclear capabilities will not be specifically addressed here, it 
is important to note that major changes in strategy and doctrine of this nature cannot be 
accomplished without new technologies and the capabilities to support them.  Having 
said this, the shift in strategy accompanied by the modernization of French strategic 
nuclear forces signifies not only Paris’ autonomous mindset but also the willingness to 
support evolutionary change.  The importance of this cannot be understated in any 
advancement of policy or strategy in the nuclear arena. 
c. The European Element 
Lastly, the 2001 speech gave a clear indication of France’s support for the 
security of Europe and its allies through its nuclear deterrent policy.  Chirac pointed out 
this commitment when he said,  
Our nuclear deterrent must also--this is France's wish--contribute to 
European security, and thus to the global system of deterrence maintained, 
together, by the democracies united by the treaty on collective security 
which Europe, the United States and Canada concluded over fifty years 
ago.  In any event, it is for the President of the Republic to assess, in a 
given situation, the damage that would be inflicted on our vital interests. 
This assessment would of course take account of the growing solidarity 
among the countries of the European Union.136 
 
He remained vague as to how far France would go in terms of European solidarity but he 
did emphasis the point that France’s relationship with her EU partners may be considered 
a vital interest.  France’s vital interest to this point had been defined by the 1994 Defense 
White Paper as "…the integrity of the national territory, including the mainland as well as 
the overseas departments and territories, the free exercise of our sovereignty, and the 
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2. Chirac’s 2006 Speech on Nuclear Deterrence 
The June 8th, 2001 speech was somewhat of an unusual occurrence in French 
politics, as nuclear policy in France “is shrouded in secrecy—even more so than other 
Western nuclear weapons states—and transparency has long been anathema in Paris.  
Few public pronouncements or official documents are available for analysts and media to 
comment on.”138  The speech further accentuates the developments of French nuclear 
strategy and its commitment to an evolving doctrine and capabilities meant to address the 
changing threats of the new century.  Obviously, the speech was prior to the attacks of 
September 11th, and as the repercussions of those events unfolded, a different and more 
pronounced threat of terrorism began to plague the international community.  In response 
to this and several other factors, to be discussed later, Chirac once again took to the 
podium to highlight his evaluation of thinking on French nuclear strategy.  Many 
elements of the 2001 strategy have been updated and revisited, as highlighted by 
President Chirac on January 19th 2006. 
a. Deterrence of State-Sponsored Terrorism 
Unlike his previous speech, the 2006 speech focused solely on nuclear 
deterrent strategy and capabilities and can be seen as an extension of the policies 
established in 2001 with the exception of a few critical areas that may have major 
implications for the future.  The most significant element of this new strategy was 
highlighted when Chirac stated:  
The Leaders of states, who would use terrorist means against us, as well as 
those who would envision using…Weapons of Mass Destruction, must 
understand that they would lay themselves open to a firm and fitting 
response on our part.  This response could be a conventional one. It could 
also be of a different kind. 139   
 
This statement clearly indicates that a nuclear retaliation is now one of the options that 
the French are willing to utilize against state-sponsored terrorism.  This is the first time 
anyone has addressed the response to terrorism in nuclear terms through a public forum.  
This strategy pertains only to state-sponsored terrorism, implies also non-state actors.  
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France has never considered her nuclear deterrent useful against terrorist groups, only 
states.  The justification behind this policy was spelled out by Minister of Defense 
Michele Alliot-Marie in testimony concerning Chirac’s speech when she stated:   
Faced with regional powers wishing to acquire nuclear weapons, it 
[France] must take into account the danger of terrorist groups being used 
by their governments.  Facing also states armed with weapons of mass 
destruction whose governments could have failed, transforming hem into 
lawless zones, it must consider the implications that would follow the 
seizure of power by terrorist networks.140 
 
Although Paris continues to maintain that major power threats are its primary deterrence 
concern, it is clear that she has opened the door for deterrence to be used in a completely 
new fashion and has presented a ground-breaking warning to those states that may have 
links to terrorist organizations. 
b. Striking at the “Capacity to Act” 
The second new element of the 2006 Chirac speech pertains to France’s 
ability to precisely and controllably strike at adversaries’ “power centers, its capacity to 
act.”141  According to David Yost, the French concept of “capacity to act” is distinct from 
its “power centers” in that the French could detonate a nuclear weapon at high altitude 
creating an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that “could jam, cripple or destroy all of the 
enemy’s non-EMP-hardened computers and communications systems.”142  Such a 
controllable strike could render a potential enemy incapable of future actions but would 
not produce the fatal blast or effects of a direct nuclear attack thereby limiting collateral 
damage.  This more discriminate and controllable option can be seen as the result of the 
modernization program that Chirac alluded to in his 2001 speech giving France multiple 
options in terms of strike potential that could reach specific political objectives. 
c. The “Warning Shot” Revisited 
The third element is a more implicit description of how exactly these new 
and improved weapons capabilities could be used within the nuclear strategy.  As was 
alluded to in Chirac’s 2001 speech, the “final warning” (ultime avertissement) has now 
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become a fully advertised part of the French nuclear strategy.  While only hints were 
given during the 2001 speech, the “final warning” has been reinstated as an acknowledge 
element of French nuclear deterrence in 2006.  The “final warning” had virtually 
disappeared from nuclear tactics after the Cold War, but now has resurfaced with a 
different meaning and within a different context.  In the Cold War the “final warning” 
was intended to be a deterrent against possible Soviet aggression.  It was intended to 
convince the Soviet Union to stop any further westward movement by conducting a strike 
that would cause enough damage that the Soviet Union would discontinue or halt any 
attack due to a looming “anti-cities” attack.  According to David Yost, “France’s delivery 
systems would be more flexible, accurate, and controllable: the warhead yields might be 
smaller, and the targets would be selected with the intention of demonstrating France’s 
ability to destroy the adversary’s ‘power centers, his capacity to act.’”143  This would 
avoid high collateral damage targets which might be unacceptable to strike. 
d. Broadening “Vital Interests” 
A final new element emerged when President Chirac reiterated the core 
interests protected by nuclear deterrence and included “strategic supplies”, a new vital 
interest to be considered.  Chirac stated: 
The integrity of our territory, the protection of our population, the free 
exercise of our sovereignty will always be the core of our vital interests. 
But they are not limited to these. The perception of these interests is 
changing with the pace of the world, a world marked by the growing 
interdependence of European countries and also by the impact of 
globalization. For example, safeguarding our strategic supplies or the 
defense of allied countries are, among others, interests that must be 
protected. Assessing the scale and potential consequences of an 
unbearable act of aggression, threat or blackmail perpetrated against these 
interests would be the responsibility of the President of the Republic. This 
analysis could, if necessary, lead to consider that these situations fall 
within the scope of our vital interests.144 
 
Although vague on exactly what “strategic supplies” would mean, the Minister of 
Defense clarified at least one of the areas, namely “energy” resources.145  France thus 
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recognizes the impact the global economy and the increased demand for resources could 
have on national security and has taken steps to include this in their doctrine. 
e. Strengthening Nuclear Capability 
In the 2001 speech, Chirac continued to emphasize the modernization of 
the nuclear forces that would support the revised strategy, particularly the more 
discriminate and controllable options.  He highlighted the capability of French 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to carry a smaller number of warheads 
which would cause less destruction than a fully loaded one and with a high degree of 
accuracy.  Additionally, he underscored the advancements in missile technology when he 
discussed the M51 ballistic missile and the Air-to-Ground Medium Range Missile system 
(ASMPA).  The M51 has an intercontinental range and the ASMP-A can be dropped 
from bomber aircraft launched from aircraft carriers. These developments, which will be 
fully operational by 2010, are what Chirac referred to when he said: “We are in a position 
to inflict damage of any kind on a major power that would want to attack interests we 
would regard as vital.  Against a regional power, our choice would not be between 
inaction or annihilation.”146  The combination of new and modernized weapons affords 
France the ability of a graduated strike capability commensurate to the threat at hand. 
f. European Nuclear Deterrence  
There is another noteworthy addition to French strategy that may have 
wide-ranging implication for the European Continent and the EU.  In his speech President 
Chirac broached the concept of a European nuclear deterrence when he stated: 
Moreover, the development of the European Security and Defense Policy, 
the growing interweaving of the interests of European Union countries and 
the solidarity that now exists between them, make French nuclear 
deterrence, by its very existence, a core element in the security of the 
European continent. In 1995, France put forward the ambitious idea of 
concerted deterrence in order to launch a debate at European level on this 
issue. I still believe that, when the time comes, we shall have to ask 
ourselves the question of a common Defense that would take account of 
existing deterrent forces, with a view to a strong Europe responsible for its 
security. European Union member states have, moreover, begun to reflect 
together on what are, or will be, their common security interests. And I 
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would like us to deepen this reflection. This is a first and necessary 
step.147  
 
Although European concerns were voiced in his 2001 speech, the concept of a dissuasion 
concertée (combined deterrence) was not a political reality at the time.  After the failure 
of the French initiative to develop a collective European nuclear deterrent in 1995, Paris 
believes it is time to reopen a dialogue with the notion of a unified and collective nuclear 
policy.  Many consider this initiative as a ‘Europeanization” of France’s nuclear deterrent 
posture and indispensable for an effective European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).  
However, as David Yost points out, “most EU nations are not ready or willing to accept 
such a ‘nuclearization’ of the EU.  Some EU nations oppose the very concept, and others 
prefer to rely on U.S. nuclear protection through NATO.”148  Whatever the long-term 
outcome may be, it is interesting that France has decided to open this conversation as part 
of her nuclear deterrent strategy. 
  While some see Chirac’s comments as a move toward a collective 
European nuclear capability others see an overall trend toward “Americanization” of 
French policy in that the French have followed the U.S. lead in a revision of nuclear 
strategy in the wake of September 11, 2001, and the U.S. National Security Strategy of 
2002.  Thus, Bruno Tertrais stated, “many elements of the revised French policy are 
similar to those of its allies Britain and the United States.  The French concept is 
particularly close to the British one.  Both France and Britain reject counterforce 
doctrines and maintain a rather traditional outlook on deterrence.”149  However, with the 
new strategy unveiled in Chirac’s 2006 speech, Tertrais points out the distinctive 
differences in the United States policy and French policy when he wrote: 
Nuclear weapons hold a more central place in defense policy for France than for 
the United States.  Contrary to what certain analysts think, George Bush’s 
America has in fact reduced the role of nuclear weapons in its military strategy, 
and no longer considers these weapons as the sole means of strategic deterrence 
at its disposition.150 
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This convergence, more than likely, is the result of similar vision on how most effectively 
to address the threat posed by regional powers with WMD capability, rather than merely 
an epigone of U.S. doctrine.  The primary departure point compared to the United States 
is the importance of nuclear deterrence toward national security.  This was the sentiment 
of Chirac when he regarded nuclear deterrence as the “ultimate expression” of French 
prevention strategy. 
3. Response and Concerns of New French Doctrine 
a. Increasing Nuclear Importance 
The reaction to Chirac’s speech has been mixed.  Contrasting views of the 
implications of the revised strategy have brought forth two critical arguments which are 
central to the debates on the use of nuclear weapons and proliferation.  David Yost points 
out one of these issues when he surmised, “critics in France and elsewhere in Europe 
have expressed concern that it might increase the likelihood of nuclear use in various 
ways, from extending the list of potential ‘vital interests’ in some circumstances to 
‘strategic supplies’ to devising nuclear weapons with more discriminate and controllable 
effects.”151  The greatest concern is that the use of nuclear weapons will become common 
place as a result of the new strategy, having a negative affect on international order and 
actually increasing the risk of war.  The counter argument was issued in an article in the 
Financial Times which stated, “the greater the prospect of France being able to limit the 
scope of a nuclear strike, the greater the chance of a French President daring to order one, 
and therefore the greater the potential deterrent effect of the force de frappe.”152  
However, it is not clear that authorship of this doctrine and the capabilities necessary to 
employ it will make decisions in Paris any simpler.  The potential ramifications for the 
use of nuclear weapons are staggering and require measured reflection from all 
concerned.  The unintentional consequences could result in a true “clash of civilizations”, 
total war, or even worse, an increase in non-state terrorist attacks,  that could not be 
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easily be defended against, potentially creating a circumstance that could invariably bring 
France and Europe to its knees. 
b. Proliferation Concerns 
The second argument that has erupted from Chirac’s speech and the new 
strategy concerns the implications to nuclear proliferation.  Certain observers in Europe 
feel that the new strategy and capability “amounts to an affirmation of the utility of 
nuclear weapons and therefore contradicts efforts to downgrade their importance and 
promote nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.”153  This argument becomes 
particularly important when viewed in relation to the nuclear talks with Iran since 2005.  
Commenting on the speech and the potential affect this may have on talks with Iran, 
François Heisbourg, a defense analyst with the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic 
Research said, “it’s not the speech you give if you’re trying to convince people not to 
acquire nuclear weapons.”154  Critics argue that this has now given Iran solid justification 
for acquiring nuclear weapons.  In contrast, “some European observers speculate that 
drawing attention to military options might be helpful in the negotiations with Iran 
because…this is the first time that a European state…made clear that it is not disposed to 
let the United States alone have recourse, if necessary, to atomic weapons against states 
whose nuclear ambitions jeopardize international security.”155  Given the events of the 
last several months and the failure of the European talks with Iran concerning the 
elimination of its nuclear weapons program, consideration must be given to the 
incitement argument.  It might indeed be that some nuclear strategies will not deter the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and may actually advance the process.   
c. Deterrence Credibility 
A further argument has been raised which could perhaps be the most 
volatile element of the revised French nuclear policy.  If the use of nuclear weapons is to 
counter-strike a state-sponsor linked to a terrorist attack, it is paramount that the 
intelligence driving the nuclear strike be accurate.  David Yost echoes this sentiment 
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when he writes, “the credibility of the threat to retaliate against a state employing terrorist 
methods to attack France’s vital interests depends on an ability to identify with certainty 
the state behind an attack.”156  It is of the utmost importance to determine whether the 
country or countries that train and support these terrorists be liable to identification by the 
intelligence agencies.  Should a mistake be made in intelligence, no matter how minor, 
devastating consequences could follow and international condemnation could destroy 
credibility.  Unfortunately this same mistake was made by the Bush Administration when 
it gathered information on Saddam Hussein’s WMD capability and links to the Al Qaeda 
terrorist group157.  Faulty intelligence collected by the CIA and other organizations, as 
well as incorrect analysis, led to the U.S. involvement in Iraq, which has cost both 
countries dearly.  This very point will require France to invest in ever-increasing levels of 
intelligence capabilities which may provide only marginal levels of accuracy against an 
intelligence failure that would have monumental repercussions. 
C. CONCLUSION 
 If one sets aside these arguments for the time being, one must look at the nuclear 
policy itself and analyze the foundational principles in order to gain a full comprehension 
of its intent.  By doing this, one comes to the conclusion that France has adapted her 
nuclear deterrent strategy and force with ground-breaking new elements.  The French 
strategy has evolved through the Cold War and into the twenty-first century through an 
evolutionary process that has yielded a comprehensive and coherent concept that tackles 
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the challenges of the international environment.  President Chirac addressed this process 
and the resulting French policy when he stated: 
In the face of crises that are shaking the world, in the face of new threats, 
France has always first chosen the path of prevention which remains in all 
its forms the very foundation of our defense policy. Relying on the rule of 
law, influence and solidarity, prevention is central to the set of actions 
conducted by our diplomacy which constantly strives to resolve crises that 
may arise here and there. Prevention also involves a whole range of 
defense and security postures, foremost among which are pre-positioned 
forces.  Believing that prevention alone is enough to protect us would 
however be naively optimistic. To make ourselves heard, we must also be 
capable of using force when necessary. We must therefore have a 
substantial capability to intervene outside our borders, with conventional 
means, in order to support and supplement this strategy.  Such a defense 
policy rests on the certainty that, whatever happens, our vital interests 
remain safeguarded. This is the role assigned to nuclear deterrence which 
directly stems from our prevention strategy and constitutes its ultimate 
expression.158 
 
In the final analysis, the new French nuclear strategy constitutes a prolongation of the 
revision process that started in 1999 which was further accentuated in the June 8, 2001 
speech.  The primary goals of this policy remain the same:  to deter major power threats, 
to avoid exposure to blackmail by medium-size powers armed with weapons of mass 
destruction; and to contribute to the security of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. Many 
see the revised strategy as a departure from accepted norms stretching the limits of 
nuclear deterrence far beyond its theoretical capability. However, research into the 
potential value of nuclear deterrence against “rogue states” and terrorist organizations 
yields a much more positive and constructive view for the relevance and continued 
support of dissuasion.  A calculated policy that incorporates nuclear deterrence in a 
defensive posture that tries to meet new and ominous threats may have immense value.   
Given the unpredictable nature of the terrorism-WMD-rogue state triangle, nations must 
adjust and attempt to address these threats as they evolve, within the rule of law.  France, 
given its limited conventional capabilities and its status as a regional power, has 
effectively set a new course for others to consider. 
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IV.  THE VIABILITY OF THE FRENCH NUCLEAR DETERRENT 
A. THE END OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE? 
Immediately following the Cold War the prevailing sentiment was that the heyday 
of nuclear deterrence was over.  Efforts to reduce or eliminate nuclear stockpiles and 
negate the proliferation of nuclear weaponry became the central concern of the 
international community.  Instead of devising nuclear deterrent strategies, the focus 
shifted to non-proliferation and the goal of disarmament, thus leading to the 
marginalization of nuclear capability.  As the post-Cold War order continued to take 
shape new uncertainties about regional nuclear powers and “rogue states” with WMD 
who could supply terrorist organizations emerged.  Nuclear deterrence was virtually 
abandoned as an effective tool based on the perception that the most imminent threat 
resided in irrational actors who were beyond dissuasion. The initial consensus was highly 
influenced by disarmament and nonproliferation regimes as well as preventive war 
supporters.  This led many to conclude that nuclear deterrence had only a limited role and 
effectiveness against “rogue states”, and in particular, terrorist organizations.  This shift 
initiated an effort to address security issues with conventional power as a counter- 
proliferation tool rather than relying on nuclear deterrence to thwart emerging threats, as 
was demonstrated in the disastrous preemptive attack on Iraq by U.S. forces in 2003.   
Following the events of the Iraqi invasion, deterrent strategies were revisited 
leading many to conclude that deterrence had not died.  In fact, it resulted in the 
reemergence of deterrence as a theoretical alternative to preventive counter-proliferation 
efforts.  As Jeffrey Knopf concluded, “those who seek to write epitaphs for deterrence 
and containment do so prematurely.  Analysis of the relevant logic and evidence shows 
that rogue states are not necessarily beyond the reach of deterrence, even in a world 
where they might be tempted to use terrorist networks to conduct a sneak attack.”159  The 
debate that ensued was how relevant deterrence was to these new emerging threats and to 
what extent deterrence would be successful against them.  Indeed, one needs look no 
further than the events of the early 1990s to see an example of the relevance of 
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deterrence.  Jeffrey Record argues that deterrence has been effective against “rogue 
states” and has prevented the use of WMD during conflicts, particularly Iraq in the first 
Gulf War, when he points out:  
Neither Saddam Hussein nor any other rogue state regime has employed WMD 
against enemies capable of utterly devastating retaliation.  They have threatened 
to use them against such enemies, just as the United States and the Soviet Union 
exchanged nuclear threats during the Cold War, but they have never used them. 
Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against helpless Kurds and Iranian 
infantry in the 1980s and threatened in 1990 to make Israel “eat fire” should Israel 
attack Iraq, but when war came in 1991 and he faced credible threats of nuclear 
retaliation, the Iraqi dictator refrained from employing his massive chemical 
weapons arsenal against coalition forces or Israel.  If Saddam Hussein was 
effectively deterred from using WMD against enemies capable of inflicting 
unacceptable retaliation, he was also most unlikely even to have contemplated 
transferring such weapons to organizations that were not so deterred.160 
 
This adds considerable weight to the theory that rogue states can be dissuaded from using 
WMD in a conflict, and that deterrence may spill over to prevent proliferation.  In 
essence, nuclear weapons and deterrent strategies will “remain a central feature of 
international security affairs and indeed may well become more, rather than less, 
important for a variety of great and not so great powers well into the twenty-first 
century.”161   
The shift in France’s nuclear strategy should not be seen as merely an adjustment 
to these threats by using existing capabilities, nor an attempt to hold onto old “Cold War” 
strategies for political purposes.  Rather, the evolution in French strategic thought should 
be put into context of a developing “world order” in which nuclear weapons and deterrent 
strategies might play an ever increasing and prominent role in conflict resolution and the 
maintenance of peace.  Those states who do not adjust nuclear doctrine risk being left in 
an outdated “Cold War” mentality which may lead to even worse strategic consequences 
or irrelevance.  This simple fact requires an analysis of the current French nuclear 
doctrine in order to assess its validity and reveal any weaknesses, and present options that 
may enhance and strengthen the doctrine. 
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B. THEORETICAL VALIDITY OF FRANCE’S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE 
The broader issue emerging from the resulting “world order” revolves around the 
question: How effective can deterrence be against “rogue states” who may use or support 
terrorist organizations to carry out attacks or on non-state actors with WMD who intend 
their use for terrorist purposes?  Even with the Hussein example, the resounding 
consensus to the question would seem to be that they are not very effective.  As Chirac 
pointed out in a speech in November 2001, “the nuclear deterrent was never intended to 
work directly against terrorist groups, but was designed to apply to states.”162  Even 
President Bush articulated the prevailing view in his June 2002 West Point address:  
Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means 
nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to 
defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with 
weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or 
secretly provide them to terrorist allies.163   
 
The reason behind this dominant sentiment centers on faulty intelligence or an inability to 
track the origins and locations of terrorist organizations with ties to state sponsors.  As for 
non-state actors or terrorist organizations who may obtain nuclear capabilities, the 
rationale that deterrence will not be effective rests on three pillars: “First, terrorists are 
thought to be ‘irrational,’ and therefore unresponsive to the cost-benefit calculation 
required for deterrence.  Second, many terrorists are said to be so highly motivated that 
they are willing to die, and so not deterred by fear of punishment or of anything else.  
Third, even if terrorists were afraid of punishment, they cannot be deterred because they 
lack a return address against which retaliation can be visited.”164  This assessment paints 
a grim picture for the effective use of nuclear deterrence against state-sponsored 
terrorism.  If these assertions are true, why then would France so forcefully include them 
in its nuclear deterrent strategy and highlight a policy that may not be realistic or 
feasible? 
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1. Deterrence against State and Non-State Actors 
Given the secrecy surrounding French nuclear doctrine, it is virtually impossible 
to ascertain the theoretical underpinnings behind strategy with concerns to state-
sponsored terrorism.  However, it is possible to apply the theoretical thinking of external 
experts toward the French model in order to seek some reliable justification and 
credibility for this strategy.  Additionally, as will be pointed out, whether by intention or 
not, the French doctrine itself may have spill-over effects that could deter terrorist 
organizations above and beyond the stated doctrine.    
Although the prevailing attitude does not deem deterrence against state-sponsored 
terrorism, or for that matter, non-state terrorist organization viable, this does not 
eliminate the potential value nuclear deterrence may have in these efforts.  Some analysts 
believe that the case against deterrence may be a flawed argument and that deterrence can 
be useful against state and non-state terrorism alike.  Jasen Castillo, writing in Current 
History, summarizes how nuclear deterrence may influence both “rogue” states and non-
state terrorists: 
The threat of nuclear retaliation will prevent rogue states from handing off 
nuclear arms to terrorist organizations.  The potential punishment—even if 
its credibility at first glance seems dubious—would cost far more than any 
potential benefits these regimes might gain from giving away nuclear 
weapons. Even though non-state actors lack addresses and possess few if 
any assets that other countries can hold hostage in order to make deterrent 
threats, the addresses of the rogue regimes are common knowledge, and 
they possess a whole set of valuable assets, including the lives of the 
ruling elite. The extremely high costs that a rogue state might suffer from 
nuclear retaliation should give even the most reckless of regimes pause 
before sharing a nuclear capability with terrorists. A rogue leader might 
gamble that a clandestine transfer of these weapons might shield state 
sponsors from reprisal, but the costs of nuclear retribution are high enough 
to make the bet not worth the risk.165 
 
The central idea rests on creating basic uncertainty for those regimes or states that may 
consider proliferating WMD material to terrorist organizations.  While nuclear deterrence 
discourages states from attacks based upon proportional retaliation, this theory applies the 
same rationale by holding states responsible for their actions.  This focuses on the link 
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between states and terrorist organizations because of the highly technical and costly 
nature of WMD production, particularly nuclear fissile material.   
The production of WMD is no small task; the facilities, technical expertise, and 
materials necessary to produce fissile material and other WMD are so monumental a task 
that governments are the only institutions able to support the infrastructure and funding 
for these endeavors.  This point was addressed by Jon Wolfsthal when he stated, “nuclear 
weapons do not grow on trees, and terrorist groups cannot at the moment produce highly 
enriched uranium or plutonium--the key ingredients in a nuclear device--which can come 
only from the existing military or civilian stocks of nations.”166  No non-state actor 
appears to have produced fissile material on its own yet.  Levi points out, “terrorists 
cannot build nuclear weapons without first acquiring fissile materials—plutonium or 
highly-enriched uranium—from a state source.”167  For these reasons “the technical and 
political obstacles to WMD terrorism may in themselves be dissuasive to some degree: 
significant WMD capabilities in most cases are difficult either to produce or to 
disseminate (or both), they increase the prospect for detection or interdiction, and they 
may produce unintended, counterproductive results.”168  This may be a hopeful 
assessment of the potential for nuclear deterrence against terrorism, but in the case of 
France it may also be the only viable choice given her relatively weak conventional 
forces and reluctance to support preventive war to enact regime change.  Additionally, 
such a strategy may serve as a rationale designed to gain support for continued nuclear 
development and intelligence operations and capabilities, compared to the alternative of 
reducing nuclear forces or the ultimate rejection of a nuclear program all together in lieu 
of a conventional buildup that may have limited effects and costly expenditures. 
The strategy, however, is not without its dilemmas; several issues pose problems.  
First, it does not necessarily take into account the theft or leak of fissile material.  
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According to Levi, the issue of theft or leaks does not necessarily create a problem that 
totally discounts the strategy: 
Insofar as deterrence itself is morally acceptable, the threat and act of 
retaliation against an enemy for leaking nuclear materials, whether 
intentional or otherwise, is moral too. With possession of nuclear weapons 
comes the responsibility for their control. If a state is unwilling to accept 
responsibility for the impact of any weapons it builds, it can choose not to 
build them. By foregoing that choice, it should be understood that the state 
takes responsibility for any impact the weapons have. To see that such a 
proposition is widely accepted, one need look no further than the cold war, 
where deterrent threats made little or no distinction between intentional 
and accidental launches of Soviet or U.S. missiles.169 
 
Unfortunately, some states and their leaders may take a different view on the 
responsibility associated with nuclear weapons than western leaders, and fanatical leaders 
may be willing to risk retaliation for a greater cause.  But as Levi notes, “deterrent 
threats, consequently, dissuade these regimes from sharing nuclear weapons because they 
risk losing both control over territory and their actual survival.  As such, the regime and 
its country represent valuable targets,” that can be held hostage.170  This prospect could 
highly influence potential aggressors and at least give pause to future proliferation.  In 
essence, nuclear deterrence may also provide an additional tool to reinforce the 
proliferation regime and dissuade proliferation. 
A second variable which becomes problematic is attacks using WMD of different 
kinds.  The justifications and thinking do not necessarily account for WMD other than 
nuclear, such as chemical or biological weapons, which can be produced independent of 
state sponsors and are much less traceable.  This presents a major problem and one that 
all nations, regardless of their nuclear status or stated doctrine, have to confront.  It may 
well turn out that this single issue is the Achilles heel of nuclear deterrence against 
“rogue states” and terrorism.  However, just as with fissile material and nuclear weapons, 
nuclear deterrence may be strong enough to at least prevent states from sharing chemical 
and biological agents to would-be terrorists on the simple notion that any ties might be 
seen as proof enough to result in a retaliatory nuclear strike.  Given these two variables 
which may weaken the case for nuclear deterrence, there are potential technological 
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innovations and political strategies that would increase the effectiveness of nuclear 
deterrence against state and non-state actors. 
2. Strengthening Nuclear Deterrence through “Tagging” 
Most policymakers believe that specific links between terrorists and state 
sponsors may be impossible to prove, thus reducing the effectiveness of this deterrent 
strategy.  According to Michael Levi, “its purported truth in addressing nuclear terror 
relies almost entirely on the assumption that “rogue states” could provide nuclear 
weapons ‘secretly’ to terrorists.  But were such now-secret links to be exposed, 
deterrence could largely be restored.”171  Consequently, Levi believes that improved 
intelligence and technology may allow for specific links to be traced back to its origins.  
He suggests that “building on scientific techniques developed during the Cold War… a 
good chance of developing the tools needed to attribute terrorist nuclear attacks to their 
state sponsors” may be available within several years.172  The technology which Levi 
alludes to is called nuclear tagging, which seeks to identify the residual signature of 
nuclear fissile material. 
Tagging is a form of nuclear forensics used to determine the origin of the fissile 
material in nuclear weapons.  In general terms, when a nuclear weapon is detonated or 
fissile material is used in some sort of weapon, it leaves behind a specific signature or 
chemical fingerprint.  According to Anders Corr, “current fissile material processing 
techniques leave unique chemical traces that make traceable the fissile material coming 
from not only a particular processing facility, but each run at each processing facility.”173  
By categorizing and identifying fissile material it can then be tagged and its origin 
known. Corr defines tagging as “repossessing the materials or establishing unique tags 
that each fissionable piece yields a unique post-explosion signature analogous to 
stamping each manufactured bullet with an indelible serial number and maintain 
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ammunition registration documents.”174 In the event of a nuclear or radiological attack, 
this chemical fingerprint could be traced back to the origins of its processing.  Because 
states are currently the only manufacturers of fissile material they could then be 
implicated in the attack and consequently held accountable.  This system would 
discourage states or regimes in possession of nuclear capabilities from sharing fissile 
material based on the technological capability of determining its source and identifying 
those states which may provide clandestine terrorist organizations with fissile material.  It 
must be noted that as of date, no official international program exists to enact a nuclear 
tagging program.  However, efforts to complete such work are underway in the United 
States supported by the National Research Council, the Pentagon’s Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency, and the National Science Foundation.175  It is unknown if France 
possesses the technical capability to make these connections; she probably does not.  But 
if she does, or someday may, it would considerably strengthen the deterrent threat.  
However, without such a technology a nuclear strategy is less credible.  As Levi puts it, 
“if it can put the tools in place and let its enemies know of their existence, deterrence 
could become one of the most valuable tools in the war on terror.”176   
The tagging of nuclear fissile material does have its dilemmas as well.  Tagging 
of nuclear material would entail the cooperation and assistance of those states in 
possession of nuclear processing capabilities or stockpiles.  As witnessed in the 
inspection process of Iraq’s nuclear facilities prior to the 2003 invasion, this endeavor is 
not easily achieved, or even permitted by belligerent states.  However, as Corr points out, 
“non-agreement to cooperate with nuclear inspectors or tag fissile materials should be 
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seen as non-cooperation and countered by pressures and sanctions.  As additional states 
agree to tag fissile material, pressure increases on non-tagging states.  Each state has an 
incentive to tag and register its fissile materials with other states and the IAEA, as not 
doing so will put them under suspicion in the case of a blind-side attack.”177  If 
international consensus could be established based on the useful benefits of nuclear 
tagging and an international tagging regime instituted, this would exponentially increase 
the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.  This would be a monumental undertaking, but 
certainly not an insurmountable one.  Regardless of such technology some analysts argue 
that a deterrence threat may be sufficient enough to dissuade would-be state sponsors 
simply because of the uncertainty that ties to terrorists may be uncovered and links to 
specific strikes may incite retaliation. 
3. Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and “Regime Change”: 
Conflicting Means to an End 
The invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies in 2003, after the 
September 11, 2001, attacks and the invasion of Afghanistan, represented a fundamental 
shift from deterrence toward a  preventive war strategy of regime change against so-
called “rogue states” seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.  This new strategy was meant 
to be a counter-proliferation tool to prevent the development of WMD by a “rogue state” 
who could then transfer them to a terrorist organization.  According to a recent Policy 
Analysis article, “the doctrine reflected a loss of confidence in traditional nuclear 
deterrence; “rogue states,” it was believed, were irrational and might launch attacks on 
the United States or transfer weapons of mass destruction to terrorist organizations.”178  
Researchers such as Jasen Castillo and Jeffrey Record suggest this shift in strategy 
undermines the utility of nuclear deterrence and is counterproductive to nuclear 
proliferation.  They support the notion that nuclear deterrence may be far more effective 
against “rogue states” and their potential terrorist allies compared to a doctrine based on 
preventive military action which has very questionable outcomes.  
The reasoning behind this assertion is based on the results that preventive war 
may produce.  Preventive war may inspire other states to obtain WMD capabilities; or 
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encourage states to share their WMD stockpiles with terrorist organizations.  The first 
argument, comprehensively articulated by Jeffrey Record, is that preventive war is 
contrary to long-standing international norms, not to mention prohibited by the United 
Nations Charter, and may result in costly and unpredictable effects that could further 
exacerbate regional conflicts and strategic concerns, as well as facilitate the further 
proliferation of WMD to other states concerned about regional security issues.  Record 
maintains that rogue states seek to acquire nuclear weapons for the same reasons other 
states do: 
The assumption that rogue states seek nuclear weapons solely for 
offensive purposes (coercion, blackmail, attack) serves the argument for 
preventive war against them, but it ignores the deterrent/defensive 
functions those weapons also perform, as well as the record of rogue state 
non-use of WMD against hated enemies capable of inflicting unacceptable 
retaliation.  That record demonstrates that deterrence has worked. In the 
case of Iraq, Iran, and other Gulf states, nuclear weapons acquisition 
motives include deterrence of another regional power, strategic equality 
with Israel, and deterrence of intervention by outside powers, especially 
(in the post-Soviet era) the United States. It is eminently plausible, as 
Mullins observes, that “a Gulf state might believe that, by obtaining a 
nuclear capability that could put at risk the forces deployed for 
intervention by outside powers or that could put at risk the cities of any 
regional state providing bases for these forces, it could deter an 
intervention.”179 
 
The importance of this point is that states may acquire nuclear, chemical or biological 
weapons for reasons that far exceed the prevailing view that they would be used against 
western states.  Their own security concerns may prompt them to obtain them, regardless 
of political or international condemnation.   
Preventive war, as with the case of Iraq, provides other states with a solid 
justification to acquire or develop WMD capability in order to deter an attack by a 
stronger state.  If faced with the imminent or perceived threat of preventive attack, states 
are more than likely to seek some sort of weapon to counter-balance a dominant 
conventional force or threaten strategic locations in order to seek a balance of power.  
Speaking about the U.S. policy on Iraq and its repercussions, Anthony Blinken of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies contends that, “putting military preemption 
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at the heart of national security policy signals America’s enemies that their only 
insurance policy against regime change is to acquire WMD as quickly as possible, 
precipitating the very danger Washington seeks to prevent.”180  In his analysis Record 
highlights the effectiveness of deterrence during the first Gulf War and maintains that 
preventive war cannot be a substitute for nuclear deterrence and should only be 
considered as a last resort when deterrence has failed.  In the final analysis, it is not the 
mere presence of WMD in hostile hands—but rather their use—that kills and destroys.  
Accordingly, if their use can be deterred—and the evidence suggests that deterrence does 
work against rogue states, if not terrorist organizations, then deterrence of their use is 
manifestly a much more attractive policy option than war to prevent their acquisition.”181 
Concerning the second argument, Jasen Castillo asserts that preventive war may 
also facilitate the more ominous threat of a state transferring existing WMD to terrorists.  
Preventive war, according to Castillo: 
Undercuts if not removes another state’s ability to make a deterrent threat.  
Effective deterrence requires states to threaten potential opponents with a 
costly response that outweighs the benefits of some action they had 
contemplated.  One way to deter an adversary is to hold hostage 
something that the adversary values.  Typically, threats to deter nuclear 
attacks against a state’s homeland hold the potential attacker’s own 
territory hostage.182   
 
If a regime feels that its survival is in question due to a potential preventive conventional 
attack by a much stronger power seeking to enact a “regime change”, deterrent value is 
lost and an unpredictable and undesirable outcome may be the result.  As Castillo points 
out:   
With a regime on the verge of losing control, deterrent threats lose their 
punch, removing restraints on the transfer of nuclear weapons to terrorists.  
Governments threatened with extinction might ask themselves, “Why not 
give nuclear weapons to terrorists? What better way of exacting revenge?” 
Even then, these states might instead try to use nuclear weapons to restore 
deterrence or to improve the conventional balance on the battlefield.  
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In this scenario, a preventive military action may cause a state to hand over its 
WMD assets to a terrorist organization creating an intelligence situation which would be 
difficult to counteract.  In this case, as Castillo indicates, “deterrence, when measured 
against prevention, still maintains enough credibility to prevent rogue states from sharing 
nuclear weapons with terrorists.”183  These two arguments do not mean that preventive 
war is always off the table, but that deterrence is discredited if preventive war is enacted.  
In essence, deterrence never gets a chance to be utilized.  As Record points out, “although 
few dispute the inherent difficulty of deterring terrorist attacks by suicidal fanatics, 
deterrence directed against the use of WMD so far appears to have worked against rogue 
states.  Deterrence, when it works, is certainly cheaper than preventive war waged for 
rogue-state regime change.”184 
The implications of these arguments for existing nuclear powers, particularly 
Britain and the United States, may have a decisive impact on deterrent strategy and the 
future use of preventive force.  In Operation Iraqi Freedom, as far as is known, these 
scenarios may not have happened because Hussein actually had no stockpiles of WMD.  
If he had, the long-term outcome of the war may be even worse than what has already 
transpired.  Nevertheless, these arguments provide a sound justification to refine and 
adjust nuclear strategy and to reap the continuing benefits of deterrence.  In essence, 
viewed from this perspective, nuclear deterrence may act as a multiplier for non-
proliferation efforts while providing a certain level of diplomacy to occur.  Nuclear 
deterrence should never be a substitute for the non-proliferation regime, but it can 
complement its goals if accurately utilized under a policy of deterrence first, preventive 
war last. 
C. ASSESSING FRANCE’S NUCLEAR DETERRENT CREDIBILITY  
States may make threats of retaliation and promote doctrines of deterrence, but 
ultimately those are tools of rhetorical value only.  What matters most is the credibility to 
back up those doctrines or threats with actual force.  The problem with credibility, as 
Freedman points out, is that it is “a difficult concept because it resides ultimately in the 
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mind of the beholder rather than in the one who was trying to create the impression.”185  
This creates a dilemma for deterrence because a potential aggressor may interpret 
situations and capabilities much differently than desired.  As Jonathan Mercer indicates 
in his book Reputation and International Politics, “the central problem in deterrence 
theory is making threats and promises credible.”186  
Because states cannot control their own credibility, they must rely on certain 
means to support credibility. Mercer describes the means to further credibility as 
“resolve, capability, and interests.”187  These play upon each other to strengthen or 
weaken credibility.  Resolve is the length to which a state will go to keep its promises; its 
“political will.”  Capability is the ability to enact the outcome desired; the means at its 
disposal.  And interests are those commodities that a state most values, whether it be 
national property, strategic relationships, or economic ties.188  Interests and resolve 
interact neatly; “when interests are high, so is resolve; when interests are low, so is 
resolve…predicting the target’s behavior depends upon how it views its interests in that 
situation.”189  Therefore, one can assess states’ deterrent credibility by analyzing these 
three areas to more accurately determine their likely course of action.  
France’s credibility has often been thought to be weak, due in most part to the 
humiliating defeat and occupation by Germany during the Second World War, and their 
failures in North-Africa, Indochina, and the Balkans.  However, concerning nuclear 
deterrence, this claim is more difficult to make.  Except for the United States’ use of 
nuclear weapons on Japan, there has been no state that has launched a nuclear strike.  
Therefore deterrence is a theoretical concept; the only proof of its effectiveness is non-
use.  Given this situation, one must look at France’s means to strengthen credibility.   
1. Capability: France’s Nuclear Consensus and Ability 
From the first nuclear test in 1960, France has maintained a nuclear capability that 
has continued to be upgraded and modernized.  Although France has decreased her 
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nuclear arsenal since the end of the Cold War, due to economic and political pressures, 
she has continued to maintain a consensus on the value of nuclear assets and deterrence.  
In the mid-1990s, this consensus came under immense pressure, but given the strategic 
situation internationally and the emerging threat of the post-Cold War era, this consensus 
has regained strength.  Bruno Tertrais points out that a political consensus was regained 
after the nuclear review from 1999 to 2001 which was “conducted in the context of 
cohabitation (when the prime minister and president are of opposing parties), it was in 
effect a bipartisan process that confirmed that the national consensus for deterrence was 
still strong.”190   
The ability of France to maintain a political consensus provided for the continued 
modernization of French nuclear forces and doctrine.  According to Pascal Boniface, the 
political consensus was able to be maintained by supporting both a policy of minimal 
dissuasion and a policy of disarmament resting on four aspects: “(1) the maintenance of a 
policy of deterrence; (2) the rejection of a posture of nuclear war-fighting; (3) the 
establishment of some tangible connection between France’s nuclear arsenal and 
European defense; and (4) the creation of a linkage between deterrence and nuclear 
disarmament.”191  This list was able to get the approval of three of the major political 
parties in France.  A 1996 Sirpa poll indicated the consensus was also held by the 
populace, in which 61 percent of Frenchmen believed the country could not be protected 
without deterrence, and 21 percent of those supported strengthening deterrence.192  On 
both political and public accounts, France has demonstrated a desire and belief in 
deterrence representing a fundamental acceptance of a nuclear posture which underscores 
credibility.  If this consensus did not exist, it would undermine the credibility and 
decrease the deterrent effect.   
This consensus has also allowed for the development and evolution of French 
deterrent doctrine which further increases credibility.  By transforming and then publicly 
voicing the new nuclear doctrine, France has indicated continued strategic engagement 
and provided a distinct warning to potential enemies.  President Chirac stated, “thus the 
                                                 
190 Tertrais, “Stands Alone,” 2. 
191 Boniface, “After Cold War,” 3. 
192 Ibid., 3. 
81 
principles underlying our doctrine of deterrence remain unchanged.  But the manner in 
which it is expressed has evolved and continues to evolve, so as to enable us to address 
the context of the twenty-first century.”193  Nuclear deterrence which is not articulated, 
making potential enemies aware of the possibility of retaliation, creates only an 
ambiguous threat.  Therefore, highlighting French strategy via presidential speeches has 
effectively gained some level of credibility because other states will take notice of the 
fact that France’s strategy has evolved--not to mention that new and improved 
capabilities are being developed and deployed to provide a more flexible response, which 
will certainly raise the eyebrows of would-be aggressors.  An acknowledged and stated 
deterrent policy, therefore, provides notice of expectations and results that may further 
complicate the decisions of potential attackers and adds to the credibility of the French 
doctrine.  
The combination of a nuclear doctrine and a political or public consensus is still 
insufficient, though, if the means to back them up are not available.  Although critical for 
a credible threat, these functions have to be accompanied by a distinct nuclear armaments 
program.  The ability to enact an effective retaliatory strike clearly is the end product of 
the two--without capability, “political will” and strategic doctrines are irrelevant.  To 
further increase credibility state programs must exist to execute the stated doctrine.  This 
was recognized by Chirac when he commented, “the capabilities of the maritime and 
airborne components, constantly adapted to their new missions, enable us to match a 
coherent response to our concerns.  Thanks to these new components, which are distinct 
but complement one another, the Head of State has a wide range of options which cover 
all identified threats.”194  In the French case, continued development and modernization 
of the nuclear program producing improved targeting and flexibility provides options for 
policy makers that may increase credibility and add significantly to the deterrent effect. 
France currently has a combination of airborne and naval weapons systems that 
encompass her nuclear capability.  Three squadrons (20 aircraft each) of land based 
Mirage 2000N’s and a carrier-fleet of Super Étendard aircraft carry the Air-Sol-Moyenne 
                                                 
193 Jacques Chirac (speech, Strategic Air and Maritime Forces at Landivisiau / L'Ile Longue, France, 
January 19, 2006). 
194 Ibid. 
82 
Portée (ASMP) supersonic nuclear missiles.  Additionally, France currently possesses 
four Nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN’s) capable of carrying 48 
M45 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM’s) with six warheads each, equaling 
a total of 288 deployable nuclear warheads.  These provide for a flexible and tailored 
response capability that is not only an asset for French planners but increases the 
credibility of the French force.  Each of these systems is currently in the process of being 
upgraded and modernized for increased range, payload options, and improved 
precision.195 
The French modernization program seeks to enhance its current nuclear arsenal in 
order to provide a wider array of strike capabilities.  As Chirac noted, “the modernization 
and adaptation of those capabilities is thus absolutely necessary.  Our deterrent must 
retain its indispensable credibility in an evolving geo-strategic environment.” 196  As 
mentioned previously, the nuclear systems necessary to support deterrence must be able 
to meet the requirements of the doctrine.  Planned modernization of the French nuclear 
force will include replacements for existing weapons such as the addition of the M51 
SLBM, capable of striking targets over 6,000 kilometers.  Additionally, replacements for 
airborne assets will include an improved ASMP-A missile equipped with Tête Nucléaire 
Aéroportée (TNA) warheads.  Each of these new systems will be capable of flexible 
payload options, and in-flight trajectory correction ability giving them more precision and 
range with a longer shelf-life than older weapons.  Moreover, improvements to command 
and control computer systems will allow for greater control and flexibility within the 
modernization program of the nuclear forces.197  By improving missile performance and 
its associated nuclear systems, France will be able to match its rhetoric and increase its 
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credibility with a more precise, long-range (capable of striking targets anywhere in the 
world), and flexible capability.198 
The political and public consensus combined with a clearly articulated and well 
thought out nuclear doctrine provides the foundations for the nuclear deterrence 
capability.  A flexible and modern nuclear strategy and force will certainly be perceived 
as a much more credible deterrent.  However, capability alone does not indicate 
credibility; capability without resolve or “political will” is ultimately a limited tool. 
Without having any historical proof, based on the actual use of nuclear weapons, the 
question then is, are there indicators that reinforce France’s “political will” or resolve 
when it comes down to the use of nuclear weapons?  As pointed out earlier, resolve is 
closely tied to situational interests; therefore, there may be indicators that will provide 
evidence which may further suggest France’s resolve to retaliate with a nuclear strike if 
attacked. 
2. Indicators of Interests and Resolve 
 As noted earlier, “political will,” or resolve, is closely linked to interests.  If one’s 
interests are at stake in a given situation, then resolve increases because of its situational 
nature and the unknown variable of what a state considers vital.  It is difficult to 
determine a future action or response.  Determining what France’s interests are is a 
difficult proposition.  With this said, there is a definite in this equation.  France has made 
it clear that if struck or attacked on French soil, she will have not other option than to 
retaliate.  This was explained by Chirac in June of 2001:  “But in the case of a WMD 
attack, France would almost certainly not restrain itself, and would consider attacking 
important targets using all means available.”199 
 Due to France’s relatively small size, any WMD attack would not only threaten 
her economic interests, but more importantly would severely threaten vital political 
principles--namely her independence and autonomy.  Given Gaullist thinking, this is 
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certainly the most-valued asset.  It would be difficult to imagine that a major WMD 
attack on France would not completely cripple the government’s ability to exist.  
Therefore, the most logical postulation is that regardless of stated interests beyond 
national borders, France’s primary interests reside on its own soil.  Certainly France has 
initiated the use of force outside of her national territory, such as the Suez and Indochina 
military actions, demonstrating some political will to address concerns outside of her own 
borders.  However, these were tied to colonial interests at the time, rather than defense of 
the homeland.  But this in no way means that a French president would be willing to 
initiate a retaliatory strike in such an event. 
 Most recently, the nuclear tests in 1995 signaled the importance France placed on 
the nuclear program.  While popular opinion and international perceptions of this testing 
were very critical, France ignored this sentiment and proceeded to test weapons anyway.  
The tests demonstrated a strong level of political will concerning the modernization of 
the one weapon that supposedly ensures continued French independence.  Therefore, it is 
difficult to fathom that France would invest so much politically and economically in a 
weapon she is not prepared to utilize.  Certainly it might take a direct attack on French 
soil to initiate a nuclear retaliation.  Should France fail to retaliate, her political credibility 
would fade away. 
 In both the 2001 and 2006 speeches, Chirac clearly stated a desire to work with 
other European nations on nuclear matters and suggested a dissuasion concertée.  But this 
in no way means that France is willing to extend its nuclear umbrella.  In principle alone, 
this would go against Gaullist strategy and rationale implying that no other country 
would engage in a nuclear war to save others.  This same argument prompted France to 
obtain its own nuclear arsenal, become autonomous of NATO and criticize the United 
States’ nuclear deterrent during the Cold War.  Therefore, it is unclear that France would 
be willing to execute nuclear strikes in response to attacks on its EU partners.  The 
strongest evidence indicates that France would be willing to respond with a nuclear strike 
against attacks on its homeland, rather than retaliate for attacks against its interests 






At the close of the Cold War the value of nuclear deterrence was called into 
question.  However, given the increase in political and military tension in the new world 
order, deterrence is being reconsidered as a valuable tool for national defense.  The basic 
rationale for nuclear deterrence against “rogue states” armed with WMD does exist and 
may have a spill-over effect useful against terrorist organizations.  Nuclear deterrence 
exemplified by these theories may benefit proliferation efforts as well and act as an 
alternative to “preventive war” and “regime change.”  As Jeffrey Record concludes:  
“The evidence strongly suggests that credible nuclear deterrence remains effective 
against rogue states’ use of WMD, if not against attacks by fanatical terrorist 
organizations; unlike terrorist groups, rogue states have critical assets that can be held 
hostage to the threat of devastating retaliation, and no rogue state has ever used WMD 
against an enemy capable of such retaliation.”200  Furthermore, new technologies such as 
nuclear tagging could strengthen deterrence by providing a tracing capability that would 
help identify the source of weapons used in a nuclear “blind-side” attack.  Tagging would 
ensure that states which share nuclear fissile material used in a terrorist attack would be 
held accountable and subject to massive retaliation. 
France maintains a credible nuclear capability that is supported by a public and 
political consensus backed by a clearly articulated doctrine.  The French nuclear 
capability provides options for precise, long-range and more controllable nuclear strikes 
which strengthens overall credibility.  Modernization upgrades will improve this 
capability and provide increased response options for French leaders.  However, it would 
be difficult to determine France’s “political will” to retaliate for an attack with a nuclear 
strike, unless that attack occurred within her borders.  Nevertheless, France has a viable 






                                                 
















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
87 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The perceptions of power and the realities of power symbolize the point of 
departure and the conclusion of the present work.  Since the end of World War II and the 
defeat and occupation by Germany, France has been perceived by its many critics and 
doubters to be relatively weak in defense matters.  The leading powers, particularly the 
United States, have viewed France in such a manner, which does little justice to reality.  
Such a perception took on added weight in the Indochina and Suez debacles (though 
operationally, the Egyptian operation was a success) as well as in the first Gulf War and 
in the early UNPROFOR phase of the wars of ex-Yugoslavia.  Those who disliked 
France for other reasons of politics, society and culture could belittle French military 
power, in the process ignoring those epochs in the past in which the French had been the 
predominate military power in Europe.   
Nonetheless, French conventional forces, although expanding in scope and 
capability, were little more than a step child from the 1960s until the recent past.  Chief 
emphasis has been bestowed to the nuclear arsenal, while the regular forces of the year 
2006 are intended mainly for peacekeeping missions with a regional focus.  This regional 
focus has only contributed to the perception of France’s weakness in defense matters.  
Additionally, the political rationale and justification used by de Gaulle to create the force 
de frappe helped form the opinion that France was more concerned about the political 
utility of the ownership of nuclear weapons rather than their operational use.  This in 
effect created the perception by such other stakeholders as the United States and Britain 
that France was a strategically weak partner out to gain political power rather than 
strategic security.  This perception was a symptom of an Anglo-Saxon dominance within 
the Atlantic Alliance during the Cold War and its marginalization of French political and 
security interests.  Not surprisingly, this led to counter-efforts to regain France’s 
grandeur in international affairs and solidify its own national independence through the 
evolution of the force de frappe. 
 The search for grandeur was bolstered by the strategic vision and political 
leadership of General Charles de Gaulle who sought to reestablish France’s autonomy 
through the development of a nuclear capability.  Under de Gaulle, the force de frappe 
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provided the necessary tool to further assert France’s political and security interests, 
ultimately leading to the mid-1960s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military 
structure after increasing concerns over the validity of the United States’ nuclear 
umbrella and France’s role within the Alliance.  The independence and autonomy gained 
during this time allowed France to develop a distinctive nuclear strategy based on 
“proportional deterrence” an enduring Gaullist legacy that was evident throughout the 
remainder of the Cold War. 
This legacy has continued to endure beyond the Cold War and is most evident in 
the rhetoric of the revised nuclear strategy presented by President Chirac in 2005, 
although in a much different and challenging international environment.  Unfortunately, 
given the political purpose of nuclear weapons espoused by France during the Gaullist 
years and its perception deriving from World War II and the Cold War, analysts outside 
of Europe have given little attention to the evolving strategy.  Other than the passing 
newspaper article or internet press release reporting about the strategy, no official 
comment or assessment has been made by the U.S. administration or other leading 
countries to determine if France’s doctrine is viable and credible.  However, by dissecting 
the French strategy and looking at the theoretical underpinnings one is able to dispel the 
perception that France maintains a nuclear arsenal for political purposes only, and come 
to the conclusion that France has developed a valid strategy that in effect could have 
broad implications for the EU, NATO and the United States, the results of which might 
lead to a concerted effort by the EU to develop its own nuclear deterrence, build a bridge 
back to the trans-Atlantic alliance, and help to heal the “wounds” incurred by the Iraq 
invasion in 2003. 
 Currently, France’s nuclear strategy seeks to guarantee national security by 
deterrence against not only major powers, but those regional actors who may threaten the 
interests of France and the more ominous threat of “rogue states” armed with WMD who 
may support terrorist organizations.  The evolution in French strategy is the result of 
many factors closely associated with national interests.  France’s relatively small 
conventional forces, although highly capable, do not allow it to project an overwhelming 
capability against other regional powers.  France has invested enormously in an effort to 
fund and field nuclear forces, giving her a strong nuclear history and viable capability 
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which she does not want to relinquish.  France’s geostrategic location makes her 
vulnerable to threats in the region and beyond, particularly those stemming from the 
Middle East.  France ties grandeur in international politics to nuclear capability.  The 
nuclear option provides France with a viable alternative to more costly conventional 
forces which would require an increase in economic and political capital.  And lastly, it 
provides France with an alternative to “preventive war” which she does not accept as 
legitimate, nor have the conventional capability to engage. 
Based on the arguments presented in this study, France’s strategy can be seen as a 
valid deterrent against these threats and may have the added benefit of reducing 
proliferation of WMD to terrorist organizations.  The theoretical arguments in support of 
this assessment indicate that France has articulated a well thought-out and adaptable 
nuclear strategy that discourages “preventive war” as a substitute for nuclear deterrence 
while simultaneously presenting an effective counter-proliferation tool.  Both of these can 
be seen as a direct political interest for France and many other states.  This strategy 
provides an alternative for those states that are unwilling to support a “preventive war” 
strategy due to its unpredictable nature and the possible unintended consequences it 
brings, not to mention endangering credibility and violating international law.  The 
efforts to shift nuclear doctrine in order to address evolving threats within the new “world 
order” have brought to light the continued relevance of nuclear deterrence and opened the 
door for potential advancements in technology and policy that have important 
implications for Europe, NATO, and the United States.  
 While France has a fairly clear strategy regarding the use of its nuclear forces, this 
strategy could be strengthened significantly by supporting fissile material “tagging.”  
Nuclear “tagging” would make it possible to identify the country and facility involved in 
the manufacturing and processing of nuclear fissile material used in an attack.  This 
procedure would also add legitimacy to France’s nuclear deterrence theory in the eyes of 
the EU and United States.  In fact, the addition of “tagging” to the strategy could make it 
more attractive to all stakeholders involved and bolster France’s position in world 
politics.  Now, it is important to understand that France has no plans to utilize nuclear 
technology for preventive measures, but there again, should France decide to incorporate 
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the “tagging” option into their strategy, she would only convince the other stakeholders 
of her strictly defensive posture.   
For years the world powers have seen the limitations of the NPT, as countries 
such as Iran and Iraq have ignored their previous promises not to acquire nuclear 
weapons.  “Tagging” would only act as a sort of reinforcement of the NPT.  This alone 
should prove attractive to those countries originally involved in the signing of the NPT 
and add further credibility to France’s doctrine.  Support of a “tagging” program would 
not only improve the attractiveness of France’s nuclear deterrent strategy to other 
countries, it could even allow for an opportunity for France to reclaim some of it lost 
grandeur by leading the movement in support of this strategy.  However, even if France 
did not lead the advancement of this approach, “tagging” would enable France to at least 
take a major role in the process.  Additionally, simply by joining with other leading 
countries such as the United States and Britain on any major project would go far in 
healing old wounds and perhaps forge a new strategic bond which would enable France 
to rejoin NATO.  Perhaps the latter is rather far-fetched, however, there is no doubt that 
“tagging” has obvious benefits, some of which could possibly reach beyond the 
advantages of tracking down countries or individuals who are sharing nuclear technology 
with terrorist organizations.  In any case, “tagging” should be explored by France, and its 
alliance partners, as an option to enhance deterrence.  Accordingly, a movement should 
be initiated to gain support for international acceptance of a “tagging” regime. 
 Many are not convinced that France’s nuclear deterrent strategy is viable.  In fact, 
some feel that this strategy would only incite the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  It is 
important to understand that a nuclear strategy alone does not necessarily incite nuclear 
proliferation.  While nuclear capabilities and strategies existed during the Cold War, they 
served a purpose during this time and gained immense credibility, as evident in France’s 
acquisition.  Recently the shift to uni-polarity with the U.S. acquiring an overwhelming 
conventional strength, is forcing smaller countries to look elsewhere for alternate means 
of protecting their interests.  These alternate means tend to be nuclear in nature because 
they require far less investment and pack significantly more power.  However, this is not 
the case with France.  France’s deterrent strategy shows no evidence of using nuclear 
weapons to pursue goals other than political and provide the ability to retaliate if directly 
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attacked.  France has no intentions of preventive war.  Clearly, France’s nuclear strategy 
is defensive in nature and could actually add to the diminishing of nuclear proliferation.  
France’s goal is to hold the terrorists and “rogue states” responsible for their actions and 
to support the NPT regime.  In these ways it is evident that a nuclear policy does not have 
to lead to proliferation.  In fact, a large conventional force alone could spur nuclear 
proliferation as the only means to deter an attack. 
 Another factor to consider has to do with lowering the threshold for deployment 
of nuclear capabilities.  It has been postulated that by opening up these capabilities to 
more countries it would lower the threshold for a strike.  However, a nuclear deterrent 
strategy that is precise and well-formulated will only allow more measured deployment 
and discriminate targeting.  Instead of a broad-based and blunt strike, such as was the 
case in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this new strategy would enable France, and any other 
country which might adopt this strategy, to exact a nuclear strike with such accuracy that 
little collateral damage would ensue.  This does not indicate that the nuclear threshold has 
been lowered, rather that effects are being reduced.  There is no clear indication that it 
would be easier to justify a nuclear strike, just that a retaliatory strike would exact far less 
devastation.   
Given these issues, France has provided a deterrent response that may be far more 
effective than “preventive war.”  The arguments against the use of preventive war as a 
tool of counter-proliferation indicate that overwhelming conventional might used to enact 
“regime change” may further incite WMD proliferation.  This contradicts the goals of the 
proliferation regime and undermines the foundation of deterrence by reducing the ability 
to hold elements of a state hostage, thus negating any benefit of a deterrent strategy or 
utility of nuclear weapons.  The denial and non-support of “preventive war” enacted for 
regime change benefits France because it bolsters the utility of the nuclear deterrent 
strategy.  This fact may offer another perspective on why the French did not support the 
United States in the invasion of Iraq.  The simplest rationale is that it would have 
undermined nuclear deterrence and facilitated the possible proliferation of WMD in a 
way that would have significantly reduced the justifications for the nuclear deterrent in 
the first place.  France, by not accepting the goals of “preventive war,” has been able to 
distance herself from the United States while gaining credit toward nuclear deterrence, 
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providing a reasonable uncertainty for potential aggressors that France may actually 
forgo a conventional response in lieu of a nuclear retaliation if attacked.   
The French example has opened the door for the U.S. to consider an alternative to 
conventional preventive war.  Additionally, it has established the ground work for a shift 
in U.S. strategy back toward nuclear deterrence simultaneously providing an opportunity 
to reduce nuclear stockpiles and further strengthen the proliferation regime.  France’s 
deterrent posture presents a challenge to U.S. dominance in the field of nuclear strategy 
and the concept of “preventive war” for European NATO countries who do not want to 
enact a preventive war regime and who do not have public support or economic ability to 
field upgrades to conventional forces.  The troubling events associated with the Iraq 
invasion put France in the position to provide a viable alternative and may force a 
revision in U.S. strategy from an aggressive conventional posture toward a nuclear 
deterrence first posture.  With a deterrent strategy already in place, the U.S. may look to 
France’s example as a viable alternative, providing France and the U.S. with an 
opportunity to “reach across the table” and join in a more collective approach in 
addressing future conflicts by focusing on the utility of nuclear deterrence first and 
preventive actions last.  This may provide an opportunity to increase alliance relations in 
nuclear strategies and allow for future collaboration in the area of nuclear “tagging,” each 
of these being a vast improvement of relations compared to the rift accentuated by the 
Iraq invasion in 2003. 
The implications for NATO are broad and create a challenge for institutional 
collaboration.  France’s deterrent posture may increase the opportunity for coordination 
among alliance members.  It may call into question the current NATO nuclear strategy 
closely associated with flexible response and lead to discussions on the utility of the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella over Europe.  As NATO, and the EU for that matter, continues to 
expand, defense of these enlarged organizations against a future threat may become more 
reliant on nuclear deterrence.  This fact alone will call for a review of strategies that will 
have to be acceptable to European nations.  This may provide an opportunity for France 
to rejoin, in the least, the NPG and a rapprochement of alliance interests in nuclear 
strategy.  The impact of this situation could determine the future role of U.S. nuclear 
forces in Europe and ultimately create an opportunity in which France could be seen as 
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the dominant power in the region.  However unlikely this may be, it is a future 
consideration that NATO will have to address based on the emergence of a French 
nuclear doctrine that may hold a more acceptable and viable alternative to the current 
arrangement and strategy. 
For the European Union, the nuclear issue will have to be broached.  Although it 
is certainly not clear that support for an EU nuclear deterrence exits, the fact that Great 
Britain and France maintain a nuclear deterrence will require an analysis and possible 
adoption of a nuclear capability to be integrated into the ESDP.  This will force the 
recognition that economic concerns will collide with security concerns and a 
determination will have to be made in order to address the concerns on a supra-national 
level.  It is certainly not evident that this will take place anytime soon.  The framework 
within the EU has not been evolved to address the issue of collective nuclear deterrence. 
France’s deterrent posture means that overwhelming retaliation will be considered 
if ties to terrorists’ organizations who strike France and actions of “rogue states” can be 
determined.  This complicates the decision-making for regional powers and “rogue 
states,” building a level of uncertainty that will, in the least, create a pause in their 
deliberations, if not deter them altogether.  Rogue state will have to gamble on the 
likelihood of retaliation for support of terrorist organizations that may use shared WMD 
capabilities to meet political goals through attacks on French soil.  It holds them culpable 
for their continued support of and ties with terrorists beyond the fear of a conventional 
attack.  No longer is a conventional attack having uncertain outcomes on the table, but 
rather an unacceptable retaliation that would target the regimes existence and create an 
unacceptable outcome for the country.  France’s deterrent strategy may force tighter 
restrictions on the sharing of WMD by aggressor states and help decrease the potential 
for proliferation.  The French doctrine has laid the ground work for the incorporation of 
technologies such as “tagging” and an international movement that can improve 
intelligence capabilities to the point that “rogue states” need be very concerned about 
their suspected or actual ties to terrorist.   
At the end of the day, the validity of nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War era 
remains intact.  France has sought to be the first to initiate a deterrent strategy that 
addresses evolving threats and created an opportunity for alliance statecraft concerning 
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strategic security.  The simple fact that France’s deterrent strategy is a viable alternative 
to other means may, in and of itself, force revisions and reconsiderations of the utility of 
nuclear deterrence resulting in a new international consensus that may yield a more 
robust effort to address policy and technology concerns for the twenty-first century.  It is 
the researcher’s hope that this work shall aid in the better understanding of the 
justification and rationale of the revised French nuclear doctrine and thus make for more 
successful statecraft between alliance members.  The rift in the trans-Atlantic Alliance 
exemplifies a need for better understanding and knowledge.  This knowledge is 
absolutely necessary for improved relations and effective policy.  It is the hope of this 
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